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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

SPORTSMANSHIP AS AN EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVE

BY

MARGARET SAUNDERSON

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF EDUCATION

IN

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Dr. Allen Pearson

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Dr. Debra Shogan

DATE: [illegible]

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my parents who stood by me throughout my education with love and patience and to all who taught me to live one day at a time

TER ONE

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point of view has repeatedly been
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as hockey and football has caused
to question the morality of sport
the 1988 Summer Olympics, in which
Johnson tested positive for anabolic
of numerous Canadians as this one-
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once again brought to the forefront
ld by athletes and their relation to
er entitled "How Urgent is the Need
and Decision-Making in Sport?," P.
ues confronting all who are involved

> sportsmanship or lack of it, as demonstrated by the behavior of players, coaches and fans; the attitudes of coaches toward their players; practices employed by coaches in recruiting athletes; use of drugs; practices related to academic eligibility provisions; etc. [1]

Lawson argues that all ethical decisions, including those involved in these types of issues, ought to be based upon the welfare of people and subsequently that the title of her discussion could be reworded to read, "How urgent is the need for decision making in sport which is based upon the welfare of individuals or groups?" Her response to this question is that:

> in order to preserve sport and athletics in the form we consider desirable we must continue (or begin) to base our decisions on the welfare and self-realization of the individual rather than on winning, entertainment, finances, past practices, what others are doing, etc. We must avoid decision making that is based upon gut feelings or emotions or hunches. We must try to influence the decision makers to base their decisions on ethical principles....that decisions about sport are, by definition, ethical decisions because they do involve the welfare of individuals and groups. [2]

It is the contention of this writer that Lawson's comments strike at the heart of the matter which must be recognized and acted upon by all decision-makers in sport. At all levels from the athletes on the playing field on up to the administrators who oversee and regulate sport practices, those involved in decisions about sport are involved undeniably in decisions which have everything to do with how individuals and groups are to be treated. Both the general decisions made by administrators about sport practices and the more specific decisions made by athletes about how one ought to behave in a particular sport situation ought then to be viewed as ethical decisions. The scope of sports decisions in need of a moral point of view from which solutions can be derived is broad. Despite the breadth of the issues confronting those involved in sport which ought to be viewed as ethical issues in need of ethical resolutions, serious theoretical attempts to delineate a normative ethic for sport decisions have only recently begun to appear. There exists a wide gap between serious consideration of ethical theories for sport and the recognition that such theories are paramount if sport is to continue as an ethically acceptable practice.

This gap sheds serious doubt as to whether educators have taken seriously the claims that moral character and sportsmanship are worthwhile educational objectives to which sport programs are directed. It is the contention of this writer that to date these claims remain nothing more than testimonial claims put forward by physical educators in an attempt to justify sport programs. It is further contended that the educational objective of sportsmanship has often been put forward by physical educators without any serious consideration having been given to the content of such an objective.

The focus of this thesis is then to attempt to offer a theoretical basis from which the content of such an objective can be understood. The standpoint from which this theoretical consideration of sportsmanship will be launched is that sportsmanship consists of those acts performed by sport participants which are essential to the establishment of moral relations among sport competitors.

In the next chapter it will be suggested that the tendency to include the development of sportsmanship as an educational objective of physical education and sport programs has been grounded in an attempt to justify the value of sport programs. It will be argued that, as sport involves relations among persons, whether or not the development of sportsmanship justifies sport programs, this objective is an essential objective of all sport programs. It will also be shown that little consensus exists in regard to the nature of sportsmanship.

This discussion will be extended in the third chapter. In this chapter it will also be argued that previous attempts to understand sportsmanship have failed to draw a philosophically sound connection between sportsmanship and morality.

In the fourth chapter an understanding of morality in sport will be initiated through a refutation of the contention that all competitive activities are inherently immoral. It will be argued that sport is an activity with a built-in concern for fairness and that players who play fair are acting in one way essential to the establishment of moral relations in sport.

In the fifth chapter the nature of acts falling under fair play will be explored. The necessity of beneficent acts to the establishment of moral relations in sport will also be explored. It will be suggested that acts which fall under a principle of nonmalificence are essential to moral relations in sport.

In the sixth chapter the relationship of moral motivation and sportsmanship will be explored. Educational suggestions based upon the insights gained into sportsmanship throughout this work will also be presented in this chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

Sportsmanship as an Educational Objective

Physical Education programs have not always met with the immediate acceptance that their proponents had hoped for. Consequently, advocates of physical education have had to justify their programs. In attempting to outline the educational merit of physical activities, physical educators have seldom justified them as being worthy for their own sake. Rather the activities to be included have been justified on the ground that their educational merit resides in consequences external to them such as physical, motor, social, emotional, and moral development. However, works written by physical educators in which the general and specific purposes, aims and objectives of physical education are outlined, have been filled with statements which are often little more than testimonial claims of educational merit. Richard S. Rivens alludes to this deficiency in the claims supporting physical education in his book Foundations of Physical Education as he notes that

> ...many of the physical education books written during the early 1900s claimed whatever was necessary or fashionable in defense of educational value of their subject. Enthusiastic professionals sometimes overzealously sold physical education as a panacea, alleging as the result of these programs emotional, psychological, spiritual, physical, mental (and almost any other) development of the individual. [1]

This tendency to overzealously sell physical education as an educational panacea has left the acceptance of physical education open to the skeptical criticism of those who perceive physical activities to be an unnecessary and costly extravagance within our formal system of education.

In attempting to justify a program, one usually searches for a unique contribution which that program may have to offer. Since an obvious distinguishing feature of any program of physical education is a concern for the body, physical education has often been justified on the basis of the contribution to be made to the physical growth and fitness of students. As suggested by Rivens, attempts to justify physical education by reference to physical values can be divided into two distinct categories. Rivens places in the first category all "who insist that it is the duty of each individual as citizens or the citizenry as a whole to be in a perpetual state of preparedness for life's physical exigencies, including the possibility of war". [2]

In Canada, attempts to justify physical education programs along these lines were prominent between the years 1900 to 1920. During this time military drill and physical education were equated due to the establishment of the Strathcona Trust Fund.[3] Under the guide of this Fund, schools received funding for the inclusion of military drill within the schools and for the establishment of cadet corps. The implementation of these programs was to be overseen by the Department of Militia.[4] Thus, the establishment of formal physical training within the schools throughout the country under the guidelines of the Strathcona Trust Fund represents a clear example of physical education being justified on the basis that it is every citizen's duty to be prepared for "life's physical exigencies including the possibility of war".

More recently the justification of physical education through reference to physical values falls more clearly under the second category of rationalization alluded to by Rivens. Rivens places in the second category those who advocate exercise for health and general well-being and those who hold that intermittent play and exercise possess recuperative powers beneficial to work.[5] As Rivens states, support for the prophylactic rationale comes "from medical advocates concerned about bodily deterioration in largely sedentary societies".[6] This is illustrated by the remarks made by the Duke of Edinburgh as the Honorary President of the Canadian and British Medical Associations in his address to the Canadian Association on June 30, 1959. In his address he challenged the medical authorities to:

> ...make your own inquiries into the state of health of the nation and I want you to give every encouragement and support to those organizations which are working for better health and fitness.[7]

This speech received great publicity throughout the country and a wave of enthusiasm for fitness ensued. In March, 1961 the Canadian Medical Association held a joint conference with the Canadian Association for Health, Physical Education and Recreation and a concern for fitness through physical education was initiated.

Physical education in Canada has continually been justified on the basis of the contribution to be made to physical growth and development. This continual interest is illustrated by the following comments found in the Introduction of the Saskatchewan Physical Education Curriculum guide:

> Scientific evidence indisputably supports the need for school activity programs for all students....Ninety percent of Canadian adults have no personal fitness program. Adult health problems are diseases of choice. Poor health due to low fitness levels is prevalent in all school age groups mainly because adults are setting poor examples and seem to be incapable of insisting on basic school programs that would create a future active adult population.[8]

Physical education programs have not always been justified through reference to physical values. Since Jesse Feiring Williams coined the phrase "education through the physical" over forty years ago,[9] it has been argued by advocates of physical education that "while the education of the physical is very necessary, to concentrate on this aspect alone would be a very rigid and extremely narrow view of the value of physical activity".[10] In the words of Williams, under this new direction, the greatest value of physical education will be found in

> the interest it arouses, in the values it emphasizes, in the attitudes it forms. Whereas at one time, its chief values were supposed to be posture, health and strength, these may become obscure in the prominence given to motives, purposes and incentives for life.[11]

This re-defining of the purpose of programs of physical education was, according to Williams, to be seen as keeping with a more general re-defining of education as a process concerned with every aspect of a person's development.[12] This belief has had an influence on Canadian physical education programs illustrated by the inclusion of education objectives as varied as the acquisition of basic skills, the accumulation of knowledge of sports and games, the development of physical fitness and the development of sportsmanship.

Vanderzwaag notes that, although it has been customary to identify the slogan, "education through the physical," with the so-called "new" physical education which emerged at the turn of the century with the merger of programs in physical training, gymnastics, sport, and athletics, nobody seemed to know exactly what this slogan meant other than it being a reaction to confining the educational goal of physical education to an "education of the physical".[13] He further suggests that many of the fantastic claims which were derived from the concept of "education through the physical" evolved from a belief that competition was an important characteristic of sport offering new avenues for social development through the physical education curriculum.[14]

The connection drawn by physical educators between the competitive nature of sport and social development has often been a suggestion that participation in sport develops character. Rivens notes:

> ...the belief that hard knocks, the discipline of training and knowing one's capabilities under trying conditions mold the character of the participant has been pervasive in western culture from the late nineteenth century on, especially in North America.[15]

Similarly, Vanderzwaag notes:

> Throughout the 20th century many attempts have been made to justify programs in sport and physical education on the grounds that participation in these programs contribute in some way to the development of positive

> attitudes. Most frequently these claims have manifested themselves in the suggestion that sport builds character.[16]

The modern belief that sport can play an important role in character development can be traced back to public school education in England at the turn of the nineteenth century as it was here that team games were extolled for their efficiency as a means of character education.[17] The term "muscular-Christianity" has been coined to describe the approach to education found in nineteenth-century England which sought to educate the whole person into one who would be of service to society. Underlying this educational philosophy was a belief that the educated person would move into one of three basic areas: the professions, the military, the civil service. Accordingly, the chief function of the public school was to develop individuals who were capable of withstanding the physical and psychological rigors of imperial duty. The education offered was to provide one with the means to cope with the unexpected and to develop self-reliance, while promoting loyalty and adherence to a code of conduct. These educational objectives were to be accomplished through participation in sport.[18] Thus, Rivens notes:

> ...reforms made at Rugby during the second and third decade of the nineteenth century paved the way for games to become the primary element in molding a boy's character in a Victorian educational system that prepared gentlemen to take their places as respected leaders in the ever expanding Empire.[19]

In modern times, the belief that sport can play a significant role in the development of character has generally been attached to a belief that all aspects of one's education ought to be directed at educating the whole person into one who would be of service to society. In North America this belief has often been discussed in terms of the potential for sport to promote attitudes which are necessary for the preservation and extension of democratic living. This tendency is illustrated by the discussions of character development and sport put forward by Delbert Oberteuffer who has been one of the more prolific champions of this cause, expressing his beliefs in numerous sources. In the first edition of the text, Physical Education: A Textbook of Principles for Professional Students, Oberteuffer discusses the teaching of values through physical education in a chapter entitled "Growth in Social Responsibilities." This placement of his discussion reflects his contention that sport can play a role in developing attitudes which are necessary for "the preservation and extension of democratic culture".[20] In this light, he suggests that "perhaps the ultimate social skill required for successful living in a democracy is a respect for the personality of others".[21] Adding to this contention, Oberteuffer suggests:

> When people see each other in the informality of physical education situations, under the pressures of games and sport, in the freedoms of group games and dance, in the gaiety of play, they can learn to respect or hate, treat fairly or meanly, honor or ridicule.[22]

This discussion of the educational objective of character development also reflects an important insight which has been much neglected by advocates of the belief that sport can play a valuable role in social development. Although Oberteuffer is optimistic that physical education can play a role in the development of attitudes involved in a "respect for the personality of others," he acknowledges the fact that this development is not guaranteed by participation in physical activities as he states one might learn to "respect or hate, treat fairly or meanly, honor or ridicule".[23] In an article entitled "On Learning Values Through Sport," Oberteuffer reveals a conviction that a conscious effort must be made to teach values through sport when he states that,

> there has been a conspiracy not to conduct sport programs upon an educational level, not to teach seriously the ethical aspects of sport but to deny the educational implications of physical education in face of a single concentration upon values in exercise alone. [24]

Having made this observation, Oberteuffer suggests that further "research and clinical experience in the relations of movement to the teachings of ethics and morality, to the improvement of psychological states, and cultivation of social gain between people," is needed.[25]

Although a quarter century has passed since Oberteuffer put forward this suggestion, it is just as pertinent to physical educators today. Physical educators have continued to make claims that sport can serve as an agency of moral education. Although these claims are often stated in a more sophisticated manner than the early claims made by Williams, they fail to go beyond testimonial claims of what ought and can be achieved in a program of physical education or sport and often seem to imply that mere participation in sport guarantees favorable social growth.

Comments made by Voltmer and Esslinger in their book, The Organization and Administration of Physical Education, are typical of those often made by physical educators. These writers suggest that physical education is one phase of school work that lends itself particularly to the development of character as it "provides more than a place to discuss character education theory, it furnishes a laboratory for actual practice".[26] In support of this contention, they argue that

> we develop character more surely through experience than we do by hearing about what should be done or should not be done. It is one matter to decide upon the correct response to an intense situation when looking on, and an entirely different propostion to decide and act correctly when in the midst of heated combat.[27]

This latter comment suggests that while sport offers an arena in which one must act, it also offers a laboratory in which attitudinal values can be developed through practice. Although experience is undoubtedly fundamental to the development of character as is suggested by these writers, the nature of this experience must be elaborated. Furthermore, although it is one thing to know how to act and another to act in that way, and although sport may offer an arena in which one's conviction to act as one ought will be tested, one cannot conclude that sport offers a laboratory for promoting proper action. In fact, it may be more accurate to suggest that sport offers a grounds for displaying the character one has already acquired. Thus, further discussion of the relation between sport and the teaching of values must be undertaken.

Voltmer and Esslinger's discussion also reflects a tendency of physical educators to discuss the social development brought about by sport in terms of a development of character traits. According to Voltmer and Esslinger, the specific qualities involved in the social objective include sportsmanship, co-operation, teamwork, tolerance, loyalty, courtesy, justice, friendship, service, unselfishness, integrity, dependability, helpfulness, and thoughtfulness.[28] They further suggest that these qualities represent the most important objective in physical education as

> certainly qualities such as ideals of justice, truth, duty, personal integrity, self-discipline, sportsmanship, co-operation and the like deserve emphasis ahead of strength, endurance, co-ordination and game strategy.[29]

Although the objectives listed by Voltmer and Esslinger may be more worthy educational objectives than the development of strength, endurance and game strategy, there exists a tendency among physical educators to indiscriminately lump together numerous character traits under a claim for moral character development which has reduced it to an open-ended claim for the development of those traits one deems to be of value. Consequently, the claim that sport can develop moral character has become an obscure claim whose exact demands are uncertain. The obscurity of this claim is further enhanced by the tendency of numerous writers to lump all of these desirable traits under a single educational objective of developing sportsmanship.

In a brief article entitled, "Sportsmanship, A Worthy Objective," Roger Coon suggests that with all the potentialities offered by sport for the development of good citizenry, sportsmanship and the emphasis on fairness and courtesy are two essentials that when excluded from the athletic program erase the educational merit of the program.[30] In this article Coon suggests that it is evident that wholesale program of sportsmanship is needed given the frequency of discourtesies towards opponents such as "rival teams being booed unmercifully, fans of opponents being abused, officials of games being pressured by the home crowd, coaches allowing their players to use roughhouse tactics to win".[31]

Comments made fifteen years later by physical educators in Alberta echo Coon's comments on the worthiness of sportsmanship as an educational objective and a need for a re-emphasis being placed on this objective. John Semkulay, the athletic specialist with the Calgary Board of Education in 1979, noted that "whenever sportsmanship isn't good, athletics isn't good - not good enough to be a part of the educational experience".[32] He further noted that at the time he was writing, the growing lack of sportsmanship seemed to be becoming a major concern in school athletics.[33] The evidence put forward by Semkulay in support of this claim is similar to that put forward by Coon. He notes that he witnessed example after example of intimidation - player to player, coach to player, team to team, fans to officials, coaches to officials, players to officials, and even officials to players and coaches; coaches who use questionable tactics to bait officials or opposing players; parents who voice hostile and volatile comments to officials, coaches, players.[34]

Both Coon and Semkulay proceed from these observations to suggest that a successful fulfillment of the objective of sportsmanship can be reached if those responsibile for sport programs take it upon themselves to ensure that all segments of the sport scene are aware of the guidelines of good conduct and sportsmanship. Coon suggests that the solution to the apparent decrease of sportsmanship is simply the education of all concerned in the correct procedure of sportsmanship and that the success of this solution is dependent upon how fervently educators carry this out.[35] Similarly, Semkulay suggests that,

> although the teaching of good sportsmanship is a continuous process which can be achieved in a number of ways, perhaps the most basic procedure is to establish guidelines - guidelines which tell each segment of the athletic scene what is acceptable and what is not acceptable.[36]

The task of developing sportsmanship may not, however, be as simplistic and self-evident as these writers contend. Although it is certainly the case that those responsible for the education and development of young athletes must know what sportsmanship is and that the development of a code of guidelines or principles outlining how one ought to act if one is displaying good sportsmanship would play a role in making this knowledge accessible to both coaches and athletes, it remains to be shown that the mere teaching of these principles to the young athlete is likely to bring about displays of good sportsmanship.

This will be examined briefly at a later point. What is important to note at this time is the fact that although much commentary has been made about the worthiness of sportsmanship as an educational objective and educators speak as if a general consensus exists as to the realm of sportsmanship, there does not in fact exist a general consensus as to what sportsmanship is. In regards to this difficulty Martens has noted that:

> Sportsmanship is one of those words for which we think we know the meaning but find it difficult to define precisely. Sportsmanship conjures up thoughts about fairness, honesty, respect for authority, self-sacrifice and sound character.[37]

Similarly, Joyce Mills states that:

> While the dictionary defines sportsmanship as "conduct becoming a sportsman involving honest rivalry, courteous relations, and graceful acceptance of results...common usage includes the aspects of fair play, abiding by the rules and the spirit of the rules, appreciating a "good play" on either team, and knowing that your best effort is more important than the outcome.[38]

As was noted earlier, the crux of the present work will thus be an attempt to add some clarification to the concept sportsmanship. Whether or not the inclusion of sportsmanship as an educational objective for programs of physical education can form a basis for justifying programs of physical education and sport on the grounds that they can act as an agency of moral education, there exists an uncertainty as to the demands of this objective which must be addressed.

In his paper, "The Sportsmanship Myth", Richard Calisch alludes to a need for a deeper understanding of sportsmanship. In opening this paper, Calisch notes that the answers to questions such as "Does athletic competition aid in the forming in youth of ideals of sportsmanship and fair play?" and "Do competitive athletics actually build sportsmanship?" depend upon some concrete definition of the term, 'sportsmanship'. According to Calisch, the definitions given in literature and in school courses are inadequate because they overlook the obvious fact that sportsmanship is not a set of rules, but rather a code of living. He proceeds to suggest that asking whether competitive sports aid in the forming of ideals of sportsmanship is thus asking whether competitive sports contribute to forming a desirable, consistent, and acceptable code of living applicable to all phases of life.[39]

In his paper, Calisch argues that the correct response to this question is NO and that in fostering the claim that athletics build sportsmanship, physical educators are simply driving another nail into the coffin of athletics.[40] He arrives at this conclusion by examining the key concepts in his own, all too vague, definition of sportsmanship. First, Calisch argues that sports in no way contribute to the forming of a code which is applicable to all phases of life. His argument towards this conclusion draws heavily on comments he makes about the possibility of transfer of sportsmanship from one situation to another. In regards to transfer, Calisch notes that little if any transfer is possible from one phase of life to another if these phases are not identical; subsequently, sportsmanship must be learned in specifics.[41] Specifically, he notes that "the home, the school, the playground each have a separate kind of behavior code, a distinct pattern of sportsmanship which is consistent within its own area"[42] and as these patterns are not identical, it is "probably wise to say that little if any transfer is possible".[43] Drawing from these comments, Calisch concludes that sport cannot play a role in developing a code applicable to all phases of life unless the phases are identical or unless one has an overwhelming influence.[44]

Calisch's argument is confused in two ways. First, he would appear to have confused the question of whether what is learned through sport will be taken by the participants and applied to other aspects of their life with the question which needs to be asked of whether or not a code which would be applicable to all phases of life can be taught through sport. He addresses the first of these questions and may even offer some insightful comments in his discussion; however, he fails to address the latter question in any way. Further, as a full exploration of this latter question would be dependent upon a full explication of the type of code which would be applicable to all phases of life, his failure to address this latter question reflects the inadequacy and vagueness of his defnition of sportsmanship.

Second, his comment that separate areas of life each have a distinct pattern of sportmanship, if true, renders his own definition of sportsmanship as a code applicable to all phases of life as nonsensical. Although the manifestation of general moral principles will be specific to particular sets of circumstances, it is generally accepted that these principles ought to be applicable to all aspects of life. Thus, if sportsmanship is to be understood as a moral code, it would seem contradictory to say that there must be different codes of sportsmanship for different sports as Calisch suggests.[45] His comment that "athletics develop not sportsmanship but football sportsmanship or basketball sportsmanship" thus raises the question of whether Calisch is himself falling into the trap he accuses others of falling into: looking at sportsmanship as a set of rules rather than as a more general code of living.

The concepts of consistency, desirability and acceptability are even more commonly held to refer to notions fundamental to moral codes. Calisch's treatment of each of these conceptual components of his definition of sportsmanship is also confused. With regard to the concept of consistency, Calisch fails to address the notion of consistency which is in question. Calisch states that "all learning is consistent within its own scope but very little will carry over consistently, always the same, into other fields".[46] Here Calisch is confusing the issue of consistent learning with the issue of a consistent code. Thus, he once again fails to address the question that needs to be addressed of whether a code which is itself consistent can be learned by sport participants.

Regarding the phrase, "desirable and acceptable code," Calisch notes:

> Acceptable and desirable are both to be put aside because many times they cannot exist together, and often a boy will learn in competitive athletics behavior patterns which are desirable, but will be forced to lay them aside to conform to accepted standards.[47]

This may very well be true, but again Calisch has failed to address the important issue of whether a desirable and acceptable code can be taught. This is what must be addressed if sportsmanship is to be viewed as a moral code or a code for living. Moral codes are thought to be desirable in that they suggest standards of behavior by which the welfare of individuals will be promoted. Similarly, it can be argued that moral codes will be judged as acceptable or unacceptable to the extent that they tend towards the welfare of individuals. Thus to question whether a code of conduct which is desirable and acceptable on these grounds can be taught through sport is fundamental to the question of whether or not a moral code of conduct can be taught through sport. Calisch's comments in no way address this issue. Rather, they simply bring into question whether it is the accepted standards of conformity or the learned behavior patterns thought to be desirable which stray from the demands of a moral code.

Calisch, then, does not adequately address the question he raises of whether sport can play a role in the formation of a desirable, consistent, and acceptable code of living, applicable to all phases of life. Consequently, he does not offer a ground for describing the claim that sport builds sportsmanship as a nail being driven into the coffin of sport. Although Calisch's definition of sportsmanship is vague, it does include concepts that are commonly thought to apply to moral codes. Thus, the questions which ought to have been addressed by Calisch will inadvertently be addressed in the following investigation into sportsmanship and morality in sport.

The uncertainty surrounding both the claim that sport can serve as an agency of moral development and the more specific educational objective of sportsmanship associated with this claim makes it imperative that a deeper understanding of this educational aim be sought if it is to remain on the books as an objective.

The need for a clarification of the nature of sportsmanship will be further highlighted in the following chapter in which a prevalent view of sportsmanship known as the social union view of sportsmanship is examined. This view's immediate connection to the educational claims discussed in the foregoing offers further support to the need for further clarification being needed prior to the acceptance of any of the claims examined to this point.

CHAPTER THREE

Previous Explanations of Sportsmanship

James Keating, one of the few commentators to attempt a serious study of the essence of sportsmanship, alludes to both the remarkable claims educators have made for sportsmahsip and the uncertainty which surrounds the concept sportsmanship. In the opening comments of his article, "Sportsmanship as a Moral Category," Keating sets out a series of testimonial claims attesting the importance of sportsmanship as a moral category. He cites various claims including: a claim that it was on the playing fields that Americans learned the lessons of courage and honor which distinguished them in the time of war; a claim that sportsmanship is a virtue without which democracy is impossible and freedom uncertain; a claim that when one passes from the playing fields to the tasks of life the responsibility to fight under the flag of sportsmanship is carried with you.[1] Proceeding from these types of citations Keating conjectures that discussions of sportsmanship are invariably accompanied by confusion resulting from an uncertainty of what sportsmanship is.

According to Keating, discussions of sportsmanship readily reflect that the concept does not carry an exact and uncorrupted meaning in the English language because there exists a tendency among the champions of sportsmanship to broaden the concept until it becomes an all-embracing moral category or to do the exact opposite and view sportsmanship as a moral minimum - one step this side of criminal behavior.[2] In regards to what he classifies as a tendency to view sportsmanship as a moral minimum Keating notes that although legislative action detailing penalties for assaults or threats upon officials by players or fans may be necessary, it is a serious error to confuse the curtailment of criminal activities of this sort with a positive promotion of sportsmanship by including such provisions in statements of guidelines for improving sportsmanship at athletic events.[3] The recent toughening of the penalties inflicted upon high sticking infractions in hockey is illustrative of the type of action Keating is alluding to here. The intent behind this toughening of the penalties is to eliminate actions which are inappropriate as they too often lead to serious injury. The intent behind this change can then be said to be based on moral grounds and a desire to eliminate immoral behavior. If sportsmanship is directly connected to moral behavior in sport, then this rule change can be seen as an attempt to increase sportsmanship through guidelines meant to deter the performing of immoral and unsportsmanlike actions. Attempts to bring sport contests back into the domain of morally acceptable practices have often taken the form of attempting to deter undesirable actions. This type of response is, I believe, a minimal response to the often deplorable state of affairs present throughout the sports world. A more favourable response would be an attempt to bring about a decrease in the number of unacceptable actions through an educational process in which more favourable reactions towards others is encouraged. It is hoped by this writer that the development of an understanding of sportsmanship as a moral attitude towards others within a sport contest can serve as a focal point from which such an education might in time spring.

Of greater concern to Keating than the tendency to minimize sportsmanship is the more common tendency of champions of sportsmanship to view sportsmanship as the pinnacle of moral perfection. The code of sportsmanship put forward by the Sportsmanship Brotherhood and the vigorous editorial support received by the Sportsmanship Brotherhood are put forward by Keating as illustrative of what he terms a "romantic incrustation and moral exaggeration in the treatments of sportsmanship".[4]

The Sportsmanship Brotherhood was founded in 1926 with an intended purpose of spreading the spirit of fair play and the ideals of good sportsmanship throughout the world, from childhood games up to international events.[5] According to Matthew Woll, the President of the Sportsmanship Brotherhood, a code of sportsmanship is fundamental to the survival of democracy as democracy has always broken down under the ignorance and selfishness of men because the spirit of fair play was lacking.[6] The development of sports and games since the First World War was seen by Woll to yield a medium through which the spirit of fair play could be widely spread. He states:

> History yields no other example of a medium through which the hearts and ~~minds~~ of literally hundreds and millions of the human race could be touched to fine issues and stimulated toward the idea of brotherly love - in popular phrase "Fair play for all and a sporting chance for the underdog".[7]

According to the Sportsmanship Brotherhood those who participate in sport can be led toward the idea of brotherly love if they are taught that it is not that you won or lost but how you played the game that counts and are taught to honor a code of sportsmanship specifying how one ought to play the game. The code adopted by the Sportsmanship Brotherhood as the key to developing brotherly love consisted of eight rules:

1. Keep the rules.
2. Keep faith with your comrade.
3. Keep fit.
4. Keep your temper.
5. Don't hit a man when he is down.
6. Keep pride under in victory.
7. Accept defeat with good grace.
8. Keep a sound soul and a clean mind in a healthy body.[8]

Commentators who offered editorial approval of the Sportsmanship Brotherhood's ideas expressed a belief that the fruits of this type of orientation towards sport participation would be "truthfulness, courage, spartan endurance, self-control, self-respect, scorn of luxury, consideration of another's rights and opinions, courtesy and above all fairness".[9] Those who enthusiastically rallied behind the Sportsmanship Brotherhood also accepted Woll's contention that within these fruits of sportsmanship lay the best hope of social well-being and that advancement could be made towards more just relations between individuals, corporations, and nations through the practice of fair play in all games by bringing the youth of different nations more widely into contests ~~where~~ the spirit of sportsmanship prevails.[10]

In a recent discussion of sportsmanship, Peter Arnold has suggested that the Sportsmanship Brotherhood can be regarded as a forerunner of a view of sportsmanship he calls the social union view.

This view will be examined in the following section. In subsequent sections other views previously put forward will be examined.

The Social Union View of Sportsmanship

According to Arnold, under the Social Union view, sportsmanship is seen as:

> a particular kind of socialization or ideology which predisposes group members to act in ways that are supported and admired by the social union of which they are an integral part.[11]

Arnold notes that under this view, the primary purpose of sportsmanship is "to preserve and uphold fraternal relationships that can arise in and through a participation in sport".[12] Under this view sportsmanship is delineated by a set of guidelines which promote and uphold fraternal relations which are on the one hand believed to be an integral part of the social union of sport itself and on the other hand to be an integral part of the larger social union in which sport is immersed.

Arnold suggests that this view of sportsmanship is indebted to the English Public School ethos of games playing. In the last chapter it was noted that the ethos of games playing founded in England was the forerunner of the North American idea that sports and games can serve a role in developing character. The fruits extolled by the advocates of the Sportsmanship Brotherhood testify to the fact that those associated with the Sportsmanship Brotherhood held a belief that sport can play a significant role in the development of desired character traits and that these are closely associated with sportsmanship. Under the social union view of sportsmanship, the virtue associated with sportsmanship are thought to be necessary both if the social union of sport is to flourish and if the larger social order of which sport is a part is to flourish. As was noted in the foregoing chapter, in England a connection was drawn between the virtues learned through sport and those thought to be essential for leaders in the British Empire, while more recently the connection has been drawn to those associated with democratic living. Woll alludes to this association when he suggests that democracy has always broken down because the spirit of fair play was lacking and that sport offers a medium through which the spirit of fair play can be developed.

These types of claims suggest that under the social union view the view that sport can serve a significant role in the development of morally desirable virtues originates in a belief that character traits desired by a particular social order are necessary for participation in sport. As was noted earlier, this belief is often accompanied by suggestions that these traits can be widely developed simply by participating in sport. Under this view, sportsmanship would appear to be, as Arnold suggests, the keeping of a particular kind of socialization which predisposes group members to act in ways that are supported and admired by the social union of which they are a part.[13] Subsequent to this observation, Arnold comments that:

> the social union view of sportsmanship is best understood as having more to do with an idealized form or model of group mores rather than as an individual and principled form of morality.[14]

The codes of sportsmanship put forward by advocates of the Social Union view of sportsmanship often reflect this idea that sportsmanship is held to be synonymous with a promotion of what are thought to be the best traditions, customs, and conventions of sport. The demand made by these codes that athletes behave as gentlemen, shake hands after contests, and in general extend courtesies to their opponents that would be extended to guests in their home, suggest that these codes of sportsmanship are more clearly akin to codes of social convention and etiquette than codes of moral obligation.

Although the codes of sportsmanship put forward by many advocates of sportsmanship would appear to be primarily concerned with the preservation and continuation of social conventions and custom, the promotion of these codes has often been associated with a promotion of moral behavior. This suggests that for many advocates of sportsmanship, morality is not distinguished from social convention or custom. This tendency to view moral behavior and social convention as synonymous is reflected in Martens' comment that "in short, sportsmanship is moral behavior in sport, and moral behavior refers to behavioral patterns approved by society or some segment of society".[15] From this Martens proceeds to note that "moral behavior, and more specifically sportsmanship, may therefore vary from place to place and time to time, depending on the reference group used to determine normative behavior".[16]

Although moralities and customs are alike in that they are sets of actions which are praised and approved by individuals and/or groups of individuals, moral acts are not synonymous with customary and conventional acts. Any behavior which has become the established way of behaving in a particular situation can be said to be customary. Accordingly, the social conventions and customs of a group are behavior sanctions which are established ways of behaving. Moral actions, however, are neither simply actions which are approved and praised by a group, nor are they necessarily established behavior patterns. Moral actions are those actions which ought to be acted upon in a particular situation because they are right actions according to an independent criterion of moral rightness. Thus, once it is determined that a certain action is in accord with or contrary to the customs of a group by determining whether it fits an established pattern of behavior, one cannot go on to ask whether the action is "really customary," but one can ask whether the action is "really a morally right action." This is to say that there is a nontrivial distinction which must be drawn between what is believed to be a right or wrong action by a particular individual or group of individuals and what is in fact a morally right or wrong way of acting.[17]

In a recent book entitled "Right Action in Sport", Warren Fraleigh has noted that examples of actions performed in accordance with what is done conventionally are numerous. One example he uses to illustrate this point is the practice of "grapevining" and other underwater defensive techniques in water polo practiced by almost all players despite the fact they are against the rules.[18] This example clearly demonstrates that practices which are conventionally accepted and practiced are not necessarily legal within sport. Just as in order for an action to be deemed legal it must meet the criteria of legality in sport (to be within the rules), so must an action meet pre-established criteria of morality in order to be deemed moral.

The primary question which must be addressed by any theory of morality and consequently must be addressed if one is truly interested in determining morally correct actions in sport is, as Frankena has claimed:

> How may or should we decide or determine what is morally right for a certain agent (oneself or another, possibly a group or a whole society) to do, or what he morally ought to do, in a certain situation? [19]

Frankena makes a further point that in addressing this question the most philosophers can be expected to do is to "stress general principles, careful definition of terms, and logical reasoning, rather than specific cases and detailed answers".[20] A major downfall of accounts of sportsmanship, particularly those put forward by advocates of the social union view of sportsmanship, is that they fail to offer either a careful definition of terms or general principles by which individuals can begin to determine what are morally right actions in sport. Such an understanding must come prior to the determination of a more specific code of sportsmanship. It is in this failure to offer at least general principles for determining moral obligation in sport that accounts of sportsmanship presented by advocates of the social union view of sportsmanship fail to meet the demands of being recognized as an "individual and principled form of morality" as claimed by Arnold. It is this writer's contention that once an understanding of these general principles has been gained, not only can more specific guidelines be generated but an attempt can be made to determine what attitudes, if any, would underlie the manifestation of the actions outlined as appropriate.

As was noted earlier, Keating is one of the few writers who has made a serious attempt to define sportsmanship. Keating's account of sportsmanship will be examined in the following section in an attempt to determine the extent to which it offers a basis for determining conduct essential to the establishment of moral relations in sport.

Keating on Sportsmanship

James Keating has attempted to shed some light on the nature of sportsmanship in his paper, "Sportsmanship as a Moral Category." Keating's discussion in this paper is at least in part a reaction to the tendency of advocates to broaden the concept of sportsmanship to refer to all socially approved actions as has often been the trend among advocates of the social union view of sportsmanship. Keating argues that one's concern in determining the bounds of sportsmanship is not to determine which virtues often accompany the sportsman, but to determine which moral qualities are essential to the characterization of a sport participant as a sportsman.[21] Keating argues that advocates of sportsmanship have failed to limit their discussions to a consideration of the essential virtues of sportsmanship because they have tended to ignore an essential distinction between sport and athletics.[22]

Resting at the core of Keating's argument is the supposition that the nature of an activity determines the conduct and attitudes proper to it.[23] Thus, to the extent that sport and athletics can be seen to be radically different activities, the conduct and attitudes proper to a participant in these activities will differ. Furthermore, only the conduct and attitudes deemed to be proper to sport participants should be thought of as genuine sportsmanship as sportsmanship is the conduct which is becoming a sportsman.[24]

The distinction Keating draws between sport and athletics and his subsequent analysis of sportsmanship arises from the etymological meaning of sport.[25] Arguing from dictionary meanings of 'sport' and 'athletics' Keating contends that:

> In essence, sport is a kind of diversion which has for its direct and immediate end, fun, pleasure and delight and which is dominated by a spirit of moderation and generosity. Athletics, on the other hand, is essentially a competitive activity which has for its end victory in the contest and is characterized by a spirit of dedication, sacrifice and intensity.[26]

Through the employment of the principle that the nature of the activity determines the conduct and attitudes proper to it, Keating proceeds from this distinction of sport and athletics to identify the behavior and conduct proper to each of these activities. In this light Keating argues that as a primary purpose of sport is to derive pleasure from the sport contest, "generosity and magnanimity are essential ingredients in the conduct and attitude properly described as sportsmanship".[27] Keating contends that all prescriptions which make up a proper code of sportsmanship will accordingly be derived from the single maxim:

> Always conduct yourself in such a manner that will increase rather than detract from the pleasure to be found in the activity, both your own and that of your fellow participants".[28]

Furthermore, the pivotal virtue in sportsmanship is generosity.[29]

In contrast, the pivotal virtue in athletics is fairness.[30] Keating arrives at this conclusion through the application of the same principle used to derive the essential virtue for sport participation. As the athletic contest is designed to serve a specific purpose - the objective and accurate determination of superior performance - fairness is the essential ingredient in the attitudes and conduct of the athlete as without this ingredient victory in the contest will be without validity and meaning.[31]

The discussion of sportsmanship put forward by Keating goes further than that put forward by the advocates of sportsmanship discussed earlier as he offers a basis for determining which prescriptions can properly be placed upon a code of sportsmanship. Keating also offers another important insight into the understanding of sportsmanship as he notes that sportsmanship in itself is a "spirit, an attitude, a manner or mode of interpreting an otherwise purely legal code."[32] I will argue in subsequent chapters that this is a significant insight as sportsmanship involves more than playing by the rules and a full understanding of this is dependent upon an understanding of the spirit as well as the letter of the rules of sport.

The advancements made by Keating in the understanding of sportsmanship are however more apparent than real. Keating's argument is in fact circular and thus he does not offer a reasonable ground for accepting generosity and fairness as the pivotal virtues of sport and athletics respectively. That is, although Keating argues that the conduct and attitudes proper to an activity are determined by the nature of the activity, he also implies that the nature of an activity is established by the attitude brought to the activity by the participants when he states that

> sport and athletics characterize different types of human activity not insofar as the game itself or the mechanics or rules are concerned, but different with regard to the attitude, preparation, and purpose of the participants.[33]

The two attitudes Keating depicts as the attitudes proper to sport on the one hand and athletics on the other hand should correspondingly be thought as two possible attitudes which might be held by participants in 'sport contests.'

In regard to the two attitudes Keating has depicted, Randolf Feezel suggests that although the distinction drawn by Keating may be plausible, in numerous cases the distinction is difficult if not impossible to make because the attitudes of the participants are mixed. To illustrate this point Feezel asks us to consider an ex-college basketball player engaged in a pickup game and attempt to determine whether this person is a player or an athlete. As Feezel notes, this would be difficult to determine on Keating's model if the player intends to play well, put out maximum effort, competes hard and pursues victory because he still loves the game and enjoys competitive play.[34] Such a player would, as Feezel notes, be simultaneously player and athlete as:

> His purpose is to win the contest and to experience the playful and aesthetic delights of the experience. His attitudes are at once playful and competitive, and these

> color his relationship with his fellow participants. He sees his opponent as both competitor and friend, competing and co-operating at the same time.[35]

This illustration supports Feezel's suggestion that Keating "incorrectly ascribes a false exclusivity to the psychology of the player and the athlete."[36] In arguing that Keating has drawn too rigid a distinction, Feezel has illustrated the fact that numerous attitudes may be brought to sport contests by the participants. As Feezel notes most often, the attitudes of sport participants towards sport will be a mixture of attitudes. The recognition that various attitudes can be brought to sport by the participants raises an important question: Can an argument be made to defend one attitude or orientation towards sport participation as normative from the moral point of view? Such an attitude towards sport participation would, I believe, reflect a concern for the welfare of those involved as this is the underlying general concern of morality.

Contrary to Keating, it is not the goal of an activity nor the goal of participants, such as pleasure or victory, underlying their decison to take part in a particular activity which in itself determines how one ought to act morally in a particular acitivity. Rather, most importantly, how one ought to conduct oneself, if one is to act morally, is determined by the effect one's actions will have upon others as morality is fundamentally a concern for the welfare of others. A moral code for sport will be based upon the same moral tenets thought to underlie the moral treatment of others outside of sport. A determination of such a code must then be generated from a consideration of how basic moral tenets apply to sport. Thus, the nature of sport cannot in itself determine how one ought to morally act when playing sport; however, an understanding of sport itself may indicate what moral tenets are fundamental to moral relations in sport and how these must be manifested within the structure of sport. Both the attitude of generosity and fairness alluded to by Keating reflect a concern for the welfare of others. Keating has not offered a basis upon which either of these attitudes can be said to be more important to the establishment of moral relations in sport contests or to say one or the other is more sportsmanlike.

This will be explored in subsequent chapters. It will be argued that Keating's statement that the rules of sport "acknowledge human worth and dignity"[37] is correct. It will also be argued that Keating's contention that sportsmanship is more than a legal interpretation of the rules is correct. However, it will be suggested that neither an attitude towards the rules of magnanimity and self-sacrifice which Keating associates with sport, nor the mere expectation of an impartial application of the rules which he associates with athletics adequately captures the essential interpretation of the spirit of the rules. Rather, it will be suggested that an appropriate moral attitude towards the rules is one which reflects a concern with the human worth and dignity of competitors which underlies the rules of sport, and thus that sportsmanship is connected to treating one's opponents as equals. Further, a particular orientation towards participation in sport will be argued to be normative from the moral point of view.

It will be suggested, contra Keating, that a desire for victory is not antagonistic to cooperation in a sport contest. Keating discusses a cooperative aspect of sport in connection to the pursuit of pleasure he associates with sport rather than athletics.[38] It will be argued that contestants can be oriented towards the competitive aspect of sport in such a way that the antagonistic struggle is viewed as a challenge posed by fellow competitors and that opponents are interdependent upon each other if their interests in meeting this challenge is to be fulfilled. This orientation will be argued to be significant to educators wishing to develop sportsmanship.

Feezel on Sportsmanship

Randolf Feezel is another writer who has attempted to define sportsmanship in terms of an appropriate attitude towards participation in sport. Feezel argues that the main problem with Keating's view of sportsmanship is his account of the nature of play and its relationship to sport. Feezel suggests that the most accurate accounts of sport are those which "focus on the nature of play and which show, either explicitly or implicitly, that sport is a formal, competitive variety of human play".[39] The strength of these play theories of sport is, according to Feezel, the way in which they provide "both a rich phenomenological account of the experience of play within sports and an explanation of the prominence and appropriate value of good performance and victory".[40] According to Feezel this strength of play theories of sport rests in the fact that while acknowledging the fact that sport contests involve a serious competition for victory, they point out that an aspect of nonseriousness is at the heart of play. This element of nonseriousness at the heart of play is "based on the recognition that there are obviously more important values in life than the value of improving sporting skills and playing games".[41] According to Feezel an understanding of this element rests at the heart of an adequate understanding of sportsmanship. Feezel agrees with Keating on the point that we must understand sportsmanship as conduct flowing from our attitudes and correct in attempting to describe the attitudes morally appropriate to sport. He disagrees with the attitude Keating puts forward.

Feezel argues that if sport is understood as an extension of play, then the key to sportsmanship is the spirit of play. On this foundation Feezel suggests that:

> Sportsmanship is a mean between excessive seriousness, which misunderstands the importance of the play spirit, and an excessive sense of playfulness, which might be called frivolity and misunderstands the importance of victory and achievement when play is competitive.[42]

Feezel's comment that the spirit of play ought not to be absent from sport because sport is intimately and in some sense originally related to the playful activity of games playing[43] suggests that he believes that the attitude proper to sport can be derived from a proper understanding of sport. His suggestion that sportsmanship is a mean between excessive seriousness and excessive playfulness suggests that approaching sport with a play spirit is one of several approaches which can be taken by participants. His belief that sportsmanship is a mean between excessive seriousness and excessive playfulness also reflects a belief that there is an appropriate level of playfulness which is normative. In support of this understanding of sportsmanship Feezel asserts that most examples of bad sportsmanship "arise from excessive seriousness that negates the play spirit because of an exaggerated emphasis on victory".[44]

Key to Feezel's analysis of sportsmanship is the notion of excessive seriousness. According to Feezel, participants in sport are displaying excessive seriousness towards sport when they negate the nonseriousness at the heart of play. This nonseriousness is negated, according to Feezel, when values such as victory and improving skills are exaggerated and placed at the top of a hierarchy of values as the nonseriousness of play is grounded in a recognition that there are more important values than these.[45] Feezel can be taken to be suggesting that the cause of bad sportsmanship is a failure to recognize and act upon other values which are more important than victory. Consequently, an understanding of what these other values are and why they ought to be placed at the top of a hierarchy and taken to be more serious guides of behavior is fundamental to a full understanding of both good and bad sportsmanship.

Feezel's suggestion that the play-spirit will introduce a spirit of friendship and co-operation in what would otherwise be a "naked power struggle"[46] implies that he believes these other values to be in some way related to the way participants view and treat each other. It is my contention, that, if sportsmanship is viewed as moral conduct and attitudes, it must be understood to have everything to do with how our actions affect others. Feezel does not, however, offer any clear insight into what types of values he is alluding to or how these are related to moral relations among contestants. It is not clear whether Feezel is suggesting that non-moral values, such as pleasure alluded to by Keating, or moral values, such as justice are the types of values he feels must be given priority by sport participants. His statement that when sport is viewed as a form of play it can be seen to be "infused with its own values and qualified by the values of life outside the play-world"[47] and that an awareness of this is fundamental to an adequate understanding of sportsmanship, suggests that he may be suggesting that both types of values are significiant to moral relations in sport. It will be argued in subsequent chapters that moral values attached to the treatment of others as equals are essential to moral relations in sport and that a value orientation towards competition in sport which will be shown to be connected to these is normative from a moral point of view.

As noted above, Feezel contends that an appropriate value orientation to sport will introduce a spirit of friendship and cooperation into sport contests. It has been argued by several writers that a spirit of friendship and co-operation are not possible in sport given its competitive nature. This argument evolves from a contention that the motive underlying competition is selfish because the only value to be gained through competition cannot be gained by all participants. This argument against the possibility of competitive activites being attached to morally commendable attitudes and relationships is grounded in a theory of both the nature of sport and the value attached to sport participation.

In the following chapter, an examination and refutation of this argument will be put forward as an adjunct to the devleopment of a theory of morality in sport and subsequently to an understanding of sportsmanship. This discussion will shed some light on Feezel's contention that an excessive emphasis of victory often leads to poor sportsmanship. In chapter six it will be argued that Feezel's contention that the emphasis placed on winning goes hand in hand with the way one views one's opponent is correct. Thus, it will be argued that an orientation towards competition in sport which is open to viewing one's opponents as persons rather than obstacles in one's way is normative from the moral point of view as morality has everything to do with treating others as persons.

CHAPTER FOUR

Competition, Sport and Morality

In the last decade the educative value of competitive activities and their relation to desirable attitudes have been brought into question. In his paper, "In Defense of Competition", Z. R. Pruvlovic notes that the essence of the objections raised against both competition in general and competition in education in particular is "reducible to two overriding criticisms, namely that competition is unfair and divisive and that it is selfish and immoral".[1] As sport is undeniably a competitive activity, such objections to competition, if sound, would suggest that the contention that sport can serve as a means to the development of morally desirable attitudes is false, or as Charles Bailey argues, "competitive games might act against moral education rather than facilitate it".[2] Furthermore, if true, these objections would seriously bring into doubt the possibility of sportsmanship being analyzed as either moral action in sport or as a moral attitude underlying such actions.

In this chapter I will undertake an examination of the arguments put forward by the anti-competition lobby and will argue that a conclusive case against morally acceptable participation in sport, because sport is a competitive activity, has not been successfully made. From here, it will be argued that the door remains open to pursuing an understanding of sportsmanship as a moral attitude towards sport participation.

The argument put forward by the anti-competition lobby in education has been adequately summarized by Francis Dunlop in his paper, "Competition in Education," as follows:

> Competitors by definition compete. Competing is something one does, an action or activity. Actions and activities are distinguished by the intentions of the agents concerned. In the case of competing the intention is clearly to win and this logically entails trying to stop the other competitors from winning. So what distinguishes competitors from noncompetitors is that the former are deliberately setting out to take something for themselves and stopping other people from having it. Such an attitude to desirable things is clearly infectious. Given an atmosphere where most things are to be competed for, we will expect children to grow up thoroughly selfish.[3]

The essence of the objection raised against competition by the anti-competition lobby is, then, that competition is divisive and selfish and consequently abhorrent and socially unacceptable. In launching this attack against competition, the anti-competition lobby focuses its attack upon the act of competing and argues that the motive underlying the act of competing is selfish. They further argue that an inevitable consequence of exposure to competition will subsequently be the development of selfish individuals.

The argument put forward by the anticompetition lobby in support of the contention that the motive underlying competition is one of selfishness can be outlined as follows:

Premise 1	The intention of competitors is to win.
Premise 2	Trying to win entails deliberately setting out to take something for oneself and stopping others from having it.
Conclusion 1	Therefore, competitors are acting upon a

	desire to exclusively fulfill their own self-interest.
Definition of Selfishness	A selfish person is one who thinks always or primarily of how to satisfy his/her own wants, needs and desires and never or secondarily of how to satisfy the wants, needs and interest of others.
Conclusion 2	Therefore, competitors are behaving selfishly. From this argument, it is concluded that competition is essentially selfish; consequently, repetitive exposure to competitive arrangements will lead to the development of selfish individuals.

The further contention that competitive arrangements are, therefore, morally repugnant is a natural adjunct to the conclusion that competition is essentially selfish. Although the definition of moral and the delineation of the domain of morality raise issues which have been the exercise of philosophers for centuries, throughout this philosophical debate is the supposition that morality is concerned with relations between humans and how they ought to behave towards each other. The more specific claim that the domain of morality encompasses those situations, dilemmas, problems, decisions and choices which require the consideration of the welfare, interests and rights of others originates from the psychological framework within which questions of moral philosophy have been posed from Hobbes' time on. Underlying this framework is an individualistic concept of human nature and the notion that the need for morality arises because humans, although social animals, possess a tendency to disrupt the social arrangements upon which their life is dependent. Accordingly, when goods are scarce, man's limited generosity and his desire to preserve his own life will lead each into a competition with others. This is most emphatically stated by Hobbes as a state of war.[4]

Within this philosophic tradition, man's tendency toward selfishness is then taken to lead to a state of social upheaval, and morality is to be seen as a system of behavior guides designed to avoid this intolerable state by offering grounds upon which conflicts of interest can be resolved. Thus, although moral systems may differ widely in detail, there exists a general acceptance that systems of morality are designed to preserve social harmony by offering principles for resolving conflicts of interest. This general agreement has led to a broad similarity in fundamentals among systems such as the condemnation of aggression, injustice and deceit. Furthermore, all systems of morality demand some constraint on behavior which may bring harm to others. Although the nature of what constitutes harm to others is widely debated, the contention that morality demands some constraint on acting from self-interest is an essential assumption of all moral systems. Thus, selfishness, as an exclusive or primary concern for the satisfaction of one's own desires, can be said to be morally repugnant as argued by the anticompetition lobby. Given the supposition that morality is directed at those situations, dilemmas, decisions and choices which require consideration of other people's welfare, interests, and rights, it is peculiar that defenders of competition have often attacked the premise that competition is morally repugnant while accepting the premise that competition may be essentially selfish. The replies entered against the anticompetition lobby's argument by some advocates of competition fail either because they incorporate an acceptance of competition into the premises designed to justify this acceptance or because they fail to adequately address the contention that sport is selfish.

In a paper entitled "Competition and Cooperation," Perry makes reference to some of these arguments. He notes that within educational literature it is claimed that competition "is very worthy, and to be commended because working for one's own personal advantage causes the pupil to learn better,"[5] and that "exerting maximum effort for oneself is greatly to be prized because without a healthy regard for oneself, one cannot develop those qualities of independence and initiative necessary for making one's way in the [competitive] world".[6]

Given the presupposition that a competitive world structure and all that entails is a morally justifiable arrangement, arguments along this line beg the question. The claim that independence and regard for oneself is necessary if one is to compete successfully amounts to the claim that one must become a competent competitor if one is to compete successfully. This claim, of course, is founded upon a recognition that competitive arrangements are abundant. However, Fielding, an objector to competition, argues that "the act of competing is thus (because it is selfish) immediately objectionable as is the social ideal which forms a substantial part of the backcloth against which such practices are set".[7] A complete refutation of this position must show competitive arrangements to be morally acceptable.

In his paper, "In Defense of Competition," Z. R. Pruvlovich suggests that "as regards it [compeition] being 'selfish' and even 'essentially selfish,' this again is no compelling objection to competition as such".[8] In support of this position, Pruvlovich notes:

> It may well be selfish to provide for one's family, to give one's children the best education possible, to improve one's qualifications to get a better and more congenial job and so on, but to do this, though at times it may be unpleasant and even difficult, is not morally wrong.[9]

Pruvlovich's argument does not successfully refute the anticompetition lobby's objection to competition as his examples do not show selfishness to be morally acceptable. Although it may very well be morally acceptable to act upon self-interested desires such as providing for one's family and improving oneself to acquire a better and more congenial job, one is not necessarily acting selfishly in so acting. Individuals are typically thought to be selfish only if they are so concerned with their own interests as to disregard or flout those of others. Accordingly, one is only behaving selfishly while providing for one's family or bettering oneself if this is undertaken from a position of disregard for the rights, interests, and needs of others, and is pursued at the expense of others. Pruvlovich is certainly correct in making the claim that to act upon self-interest is not always morally objectionable. As the domain of morality encompasses all those situations, dilemmas, problems, and choices in which the welfare of sentient beings is considered, consideration of one's own welfare does not stand outside the domain of morality. It is, in fact, doubtful that there ever has been or ever would be an ethical doctrine of universal application which does not sanction some degree of self-interested behavior.

However, a sanctioning of some self-interested behavior is a far cry from a sanctioning of selfish behavior. If selfishness is understood as a tendency to always or primarily be motivated by one's own wants, needs, and desires, to sanction selfishness would be to sanction all behavior motivated by self-interest. As this would at times amount to a sanctioning of harm to innocent others, a promotion of selfishness would at times promote immoral behavior. Thus, in failing to distinguish self-interested behavior from selfish behavior, Pruvlovich does not adequately meet the anticompetition lobby's objection to competitive arrangements.

A successful rebuttal of this position must show that competitors are not necessarily selfishly pursuing their own interests. A refutation of this nature is imperative if a plausible connection between sport and morally acceptable actions and attitudes is to be drawn. As the focus of the present work is to develop an understanding of sportsmanship in terms of moral action and attitudes, I will examine these arguments as they are raised about sport. If these arguments cannot be refuted, such an understanding of sportsmanship would appear to be fantastical.

The crux of the anticompetition lobby's objection to competition, as has been noted previously, is that the competitive motive is one of selfishness as the goal of competition is enhancement of the position of one competitior at the expense of others.

Stated in perhaps more technical terms, the motive of competitors is seen by those opposed to competition to be undisputably connected to the selfish, instrumental reasoning of egoism. The rational egoist is a person who ascribes more importance to the satisfaction of his own desires than to the satisfaction of others. In extreme cases others may in fact be viewed by the egoist as unfeeling objects malleable to his own needs. The egoist would appear then to stand outside of the moral domain.

In his paper, "The Moral Educator and the Rational Egoist," Ivan DeFaveri states:

> It is often assumed, if not argued, in recent literature having to do with moral education, that such an egoist is irrational. Yet such acts as he performs, however immoral, are rational in that they represent the efficient use of means to his ends and his end here is the maximization of personal gain.[10]

DeFaveri contends that rational egosits are in fact, "the perfect embodiment of the rationality of economic man, an agent with roots deep in our culture and intellectual history."[11] According to those who apply the anticompetition lobby's position to sport in protest against assumed educative value of competitive sport, the rational egoist can similarly be said to represent the perfect embodiment of the rationality of 'athletic man' within the 'win at all costs' motive underlying competitive sport.

Those who argue that sport and egoism are intimately connected focus their attack upon the competitive nature of sport and the orientation towards others seen to be necesarily attached to competition. In a paper entitled "Games, Winning and Education," Charles Bailey questions the continuing assumption that encouraging youngsters to engage in competitive games is a form of moral education and argues that competitive games may act against moral education rather than facilitate it. Although Bailey does not draw a direct connection between sport and egoism in his paper, the explication of sport he presents parallels the view of sport from which the anticompetition lobby draws its strength.

Bailey's account of what it is to take part in competitive games [sport] is derived from the definition of competitive games put forward by Roger Caillas in a chapter of his book, *Man, Play and Games*, entitled "The Classification of Games." He states that competitive games are:

> like a combat in which equality of chances is artificially created, in order that the adversaries should confront each other under ideal conditions, susceptible of giving precise and incontestable value to the winners triumph. It is therefore a question of a rivalry which hinges on a single quality (speed, endurance, strength, memory, skill, ingenuity, etc.) exercised within defined limits and without outside assistance, in su[illegible] way that the winner appears to be better than the [illegible]ser in a certain category of exploits.[12]

From this conceptualization of competitive games, Caillas concludes that "the point of the game is for each player to have his superiority in a given area recognized,"[13] and that competitive games presuppose "sustained attention, appropriate training, assiduous application, and the desire to win."[14] Caillas further notes that, within competitive games, players are obliged to "play the game within the fixed limits, and according to the rules applied equally to all, so that in return the victor's superiority will be beyond dispute."[15]

Arguing from this characterization, Bailey suggests that the following points should be noted in discussing competitive games.:

> Firstly, we are talking of those games where winning is the point of the whole enterprise. Secondly, the paradigm case of playing such games would be playing to win, all other cases being parasitic or metaphorical cases of "playing competitive games." Thirdly, the rule structure of a competitive game, and the keeping of the rules by the players is solely to the end of making the claim to have won beyond any dispute. In other words the rules and rule-keeping in competitive games are functional rules, not moral rules.[16]

Those who object to the educational value of sport perceive sport to be essentially a conflict relationship between opposing sides striving with equal zeal to be first. The point of sport, its reason for being is accordingly understood to be to designate a winner. Furthermore, the competitive motive (i.e. the motive underlying a choice to compete) is subsequently "to win," and as only one of two opposing sides can win, the competitive motive is essentially selfish. That is, sport competitors are essentially selfish as to compete is to pursue that which others want as much as oneself without giving consideration to the interests of these others.

In launching their attack against sport, the anticompetition lobby points to the prevailing ethos of competitive sport. They point out that even a cursory glance at the morning sports pages reveals a moral decay present in the "win at all cost" or "the end justifies the means" attitude underlying competitive sport. Armed with the evidence of increasing violence, drug usage, and cheating, the anticompetition lobby chants that although they might agree that sport is certainly developing "characters," it is highly doubtful that even the most imaginative of people would describe these characters as moral characters. The anticompetition lobby argues further that this is not the outcome of a misguided participation in sport, but rather an inevitable outcome of the logic of competitive games. In this regard, Bailey states:

> the deliberately incurred penalty is a good example of players' correct appraisal of the logic of the game since winning is the essential objective, then infringements of rules and the consequent penalties become part of the calculation as to whether an action is towards or away from winning.[17]

Regarding sport then, the anticompetitive lobby contends that the instrumental reasoning of the eogist is "consonant with the logic of the construct game as it focuses on the logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the playing of competitive games...[as] the only value in playing is to win...and any movement not so motivated is inappropriate and counter productive."[18] It is further noted that under the product-oriented logic of what it means to take part in competitive games (sport), it is not in the least surprising that "the opponent at best is viewed as an obstacle and at worst as an enemy to be overcome in achieving victory."[19] Participation in sport leads not only to the development of an egoistic instrumental rationality, but also to the development of the worst form of egoistic orientation in which others are not viewed as individuals of equal concern but rather as obstacles blocking one's way to the fulfillment of one's own self-interest.

As the anticompetition lobby's objection to a connection being drawn between sport and morality is that to compete is to necessarily be moved by the selfish motive of 'trying to win', one might attempt to refute this by highlighting the fact that sport participants can and do take part in sport for a multitude of reasons and motives. In addressing Bailey's contention that in talking of competitive games "we are talking of those games where winning is the point of the whole enterprise" several commentators have laid the foundation from which such an argument might be drawn. In what follows this position will be laid out.

Competing and the Competitive Motive

In discussing Bailey's position commentators have noted that while the point of sport may be to determine a winner, the point of an individual's participation in sport may and, in fact, does vary for participants. In this regard Francis Dunlop notes that Bailey makes an illegitimate inference that as the point of the game is to win it, the only reasons why people play games is to show their superiority over others.[20] Dunlop correctly notes that people play games for various reasons: to keep fit, for the sake of the social life, to win someone's favour, or simply for the fun of it.[21]

Similarly, Keith Thompson writes that Bailey's position on competitive games is grounded on a confused assumption that if the value of winning can be undermined, then the whole enterprise has been undermined.[22] Thompson offers an example of a forty-year-old business executive who decides to take up squash as an antidote to premature obesity to illustrate the confusion of Bailey's position.[23] Thompson's example represents a typical example of participation in sport for reasons other than merely achieving victory. The observation that individuals participate in sport contests for numerous reasons is correct.

In raising this point Dunlop's and Thompson's concern is to show that Bailey's claim that in teaching competitive games we are essentially and centrally teaching pupils to win is false and that, contra Bailey, educational value can be present in competitive games.

Both Dunlop and Thompson suggest that the primary value of competitive games and their educational justification is found in an orientation towards sport in which sport is pursued for its own sake. Thus, Thompson notes that sport's prime justification is "intrinsic and is essentially concerned with their being pleasurable".[24] Dunlop alludes to a similar position when he suggests that Bailey ignores alternative conceptions of the point of discipline and training when he suggests that these have point only in ensuring victory.[25] According to Dunlop the rationale of training and discipline is to be found in the fact that one is likely to increase one's enjoyment and satisfaction the better one's grasp of the skills involved in a particular sport.[26]

Dunlop and Thompson are, I believe, correct in suggesting that winning is not the only value found in sport and that value is gained through the process itself. Their comments raise the possibility of an orientation towards sport other than the prevailing Lombardian ethos,[27] which is the focus of the anticompetition lobby's attack upon sport, as their comments suggest the possibility of an orientation towards sport which downplays the significance of winning. Subsequently, the evidence drawn by the anticompetition lobby from sports pages of violence, drug usage and cheating may not offer conclusive evidence that an orientation towards one's opponents as obstacles in the way of one's desired goal, winning, is inevitable to sport participation. The prevalence of this selfishness may rather merely reflect that, at least in North America, the win-at-all-costs motif of the Lombaridan ethos is the primary focus given to sport particpation. An orientation towards competition in sport in which the process of competing is given at least equal emphasis to winning itself will be argued to be significant to the establishment of moral relations in sport. However, the question of whether such an orientation can fully address the anticompetition lobby's position must be given further consideration.

Strong objectors to competition such as Michael Fielding may still be correct in stating that whatever one wishes to include or omit in one's characterization of competition, one's characterization must contain some reference to working against others in a spirit of selfishness.[28] Applied to sport this position is built around the idea that in competing, competitors must necessarily take up the competitive motive of "trying to win" which is selfish because this entails pursuing one's own interest in winning while disregarding and in fact attempting to thwart the interests of others in winning. In fact, while arguing that the true value of taking part in sport lies outside of winning, Dunlop notes that:

> One may play, and hence teach football for various reasons; but in doing so one must not forget (as if one could!) that none of one's objects, intrinsic or extrinsic would be achieved in the absence of a will to compete.[29]

As in competitive games part of playing the game is attempting to better the performance of one's opponent through an appropriate use of offensive and defensive skills and tactics, a will to compete, or a will to oppose and try to better the performance of one's opponents is an essential element of taking part in competitive games. Participants in competitive games must then be acting from a selfish motive of trying to win according to those who object to competing on the grounds that it is selfish. The contention that participants in competitive games and sport contests must possess a will to compete and that this is attached to a competitive motive of trying to win is widely held.

Drawing on comments made by Suits that all games involve three separate ends - the end of a specified achievable state of affairs, the end of winning, and the end of trying to win - Fraleigh notes that no contest can occur without these same ends.[30] The end of a specified achievable state of affairs is, according to Suits, distinct from the end of winning as it is the restriction of means to this end which defines and makes winning possible.[31] He describes this goal as the prelusory goal of a game because it can be described independently of any game of which it may be a part.[32] To illustrate this end Suits provides the example of the specific achievable state of affairs in any race as having the racers reach a designated point.[33] Similarly, Fraleigh illustrates this end in badminton as hitting the shuttlecock in the air with the racket.[34]

Contestants may enter into a sport contest with any number of personal intended ends. However, as Fraleigh notes, participants in a contest must include amongst their personal intended ends the end of achieving the specific state of affairs specified.[35] One cannot take part in a high jumping contest if one is not attempting to cross the high jump bar.

In contrast to this first essential end of games and sport contests, the end of winning can "only be described in terms of the game [or contest] in which it figures"[36] as the end of winning comes into being when a restriction of means for attaining the prelusory goal is made by the introduction of rules.[37] Thus, Suits calls the end of winning the lusory goal of a game.[38] According to Suits, in all games the end of winning is constituted by achieving the specified goal using the means specified by the rules governing that game.

Any achievable state of affairs can become a lusory goal of a game if rules are developed restricting the means by which the task can be achieved.[39] The task of crossing a bar can then become the lusory goal of a specific game if means for crossing the bar are limited in some way such as one must jump over the bar using a one foot take off. The end of winning in such a game would thus be achieved if one successfully crossed the bar by jumping over it using a one foot take off.

The end of winning is commonly associated with more than successfully accomplishing the specified task using the means specified by the rules. The end of winning is commonly associated with having done the specified task using requisite means better than at least one other person. This common association of the end of winning with doing a specified task better than another person captures the essence of the end of winning in sport contests and competitive games. Fraleigh captures this in his statement that if a participant in a sport contest such as a race is interested in achieving the end of winning he/she must "achieve the same state of affairs, the means and routes to which are rule determined, by engaging an opponent and achieving that same state of affairs better than the opponent."[40]

The third end which is essential to all games according to Suits is the end of trying to win or playing the game. A particular game can only occur if individuals are playing the game. Participants must then intend this end if a game is to occur. The end of playing the game is the end of attempting to accomplish the lusory goal of the game or to do the specified task using the means allowed by the rules of the game. A participant in a game can only be said to be a player of a game if he/she is attempting to accomplish the lusory goal of the game. For example, in the game of crossing a bar using only the means of jumping with a one foot take off a person must be attempting to cross the bar, must propel him/herself over the bar by jumping and must jump from one foot if he/she is a player of the game.

The end of trying to win is commonly associated with not only trying to accomplish the lusory goal of a game but with trying to accomplish the lusory goal better than others also attempting to accomplish the lusory goal. This meaning of trying to win is synonymous with attempting to accomplish the end of winning in competitive games and sport contests. In discussing sport contests Fraleigh describes the end of trying to win as the end of contesting.

In first mentioning the end of contesting Fraleigh states that this end means "exerting one's best effort in the requisite ways toward the specific state of affairs. Exerting one's best effort is trying to win better than an opponent is winning."[41] It is not clear exactly what Fraleigh intends by this statement as he would appear to define the end of trying to win in terms of exerting one's best effort and subsequently defines exerting one's best effort in terms of trying to win. However, the phrase "trying to win better than an opponent is winning" suggests that the end one's efforts are to be directed at in contesting is attempting to perform the specified task using means allowed by the rules better than other contestants who are performing this task. This would seem to be what Fraleigh intends to be the end contesting is directed at as he states that the end of contesting is synonymous with the end of trying to win which he defines as:

> attempting to perform the constitutive motor skills, to exert the physiological and psychological effort, and to utilize the appropriate tactics and strategy better than one's opponent.[42]

In games participants must intend the end of playing the game in order to be players and for a game to occur. Similarly, the end of contesting can be thought of as the end which particpants must intend in order to be contestants and for a contest to occur. If the end of contesting is synonymous with the end of trying to win participants must then intend the end of trying to better the performance of their opponents in order to be contesting and for a contest to occur.

Kretchmer claims that a contest can occur only when there are at least two persons sharing the same test and a commitment is made by each side to attempt to better the others performance.[43] In discussing contests he notes that the term "contest" comes from "com" plus "testari" meaning to bear witness together. He further notes that while contesting involves a bearing of witness together, the togetherness involved

> is not a community project toward one end, as it would be if two or more persons were trying collectively to pass a test. It is doing the same kind of thing in an attempt to show difference in the direction of superiority.[44]

In sport contests "one bears witness to his comparative physical prowess".[45] More specificly, one bears witness to his/her comparative ability to perform the skills involved in a particular sport, to exert physiological and psychological effort, and to utilize appropriate tactics. In order for a comparison of abilities to occur at least two individuals must share the same test as noted by Kretchmer. It is not the case, however, that sport contests are dependent upon a commitment of each side to try to better the other's performance.

Contests are events in which at least two participants are doing the same kind of thing in an attempt to show differences in the direction of superiority as suggested by Kretchmer. Sport contests are events in which at least two participants oppose one another to seek a mutual appraisal of relative abilities of all participants.[46] The end sought in sport contests is then an accurate comparison of relative abilities or a determination of degrees of superiority.

In order for a contest to occur participants must then attempt to bring about a comparison of abilities. What is essential to contesting is then not a commitment to bettering the performance of others but a commitment to exert one's best effort in requisite ways toward the goal of a particular sport. Exerting one's best effort is necessary for an accurate comparison of relative ability to occur.

For example, in a foot race an accurate appraisal of all participants is dependent upon all participants attempting to cross the finish line as quickly as possible. If one particpant does not put forward his/her best effort, then a comparison of his/her ability to the abilities of others cannot be made. However, participants in a race need not possess an intention of trying to better the performance of other contestants. If the end of contesting is acting from an intention to provide an accurate comparison of relative abilities, an individual can enter a sport contest intending the end of contesting relative abilities, which is essential to a contest taking place, while not being concerned with trying to better the performance of other contestants. An individual knowing him/herself to be highly outclassed and incapable of winning could enter a race with the intention of contesting his/her abilities by performing to the best of his/her ability so that the truest comparison of relative abilities can be drawn without attempting to beat other runners which he/she knows he/she cannot beat.

If contesting is not dependent upon trying to beat another's performance, then it is not the case that in contesting one must possess the selfish intention of fulfilling one's own interest in winning while disregarding another's interest in this same end. In fact, even if one accepts Kretchmer's position that in order to be truly contesting one must be attempting to better the performance of others and not simply attempting to perform one's best,[47] it is not the case that contestants are necessarily acting from a selfish motive.

Although it is the case that in contesting contestants may thwart the fulfillment of an opponent's intention to win by bettering his/her performance and in competitive games contestants must, in fact, attempt to better their opponent's offensive and defensive efforts, contestants are not necesarily acting from an intention of fulfilling their own interests at the expense of another's interest. Rather, the motive underlying their actions may simply be to provide their opponents with an opportunity for an appraisal of their abilities. Futhermore, even if contestants do put forward their best effort in an attempt to win a contest, contestants are not necesarily acting in a selfish fashion.

Selfishness is undoubtedly often a part of sport. Meakin notes that participants are often selfish in that they "might be so anxious to win a game, or tournament, plus any associated trophy, money, or prestige, which is plainly in their own interests, that they might ignore the fact that it is also in their opponents' interests to win these things".[48] Meakin argues that given the impossibility of both sides winning the spoils of victory justice suggests that the match should be played so that each side has a fair opportunity to win and that the rules of the sport are designed at least in part to this end.[49] From here he argues that the recognition that sport is concerned with fairness offers a sound refutation of the anticompetition lobby's argument that sport is necessarily selfish. Meakin states:

> Players cannot of course be deemed selfish for trying to deny success to their opponents by effort, strength, skill, ingenuity, tactics and strategy that falls within the rules of sport. Indeed, the attempt to deny success to their opponents by fair means is part of what competitive sport is about: part of the contract which players implicitly commit themselves to in seriously engaging in a competitive game.[50]

Peter Arnold expresses a similar point in his paper "Sport as Fairness." In this paper Arnold argues that sport is an institutionalized practice concerned with fairness. According to Arnold the idea of fairness provides the ground rules for moral conduct in sport.[51] The recognition that built into sport is an inherent concern for fairness is worth exploring further both as a refutation of the anticompetition lobby's argument and as a basis for understanding sportsmanship as moral conduct in sport.

Sport as Fairness

Fundamental to Arnold's position that sport is concerned with the idea of justice as fairness is the idea that participants choose to enter sport because they find participation in sport is in some way worthwhile, that they agree that the rules are in the interest of all players and that it is a part of the expected practice that the rules will be impartially applied so that one side will not gain unfair advantage.[52] Arnold's position reflects Meakin's position as he notes that the acceptance of the idea that the rules are grounded in fairness is the basis upon which sport as a competitive practice proceeds and that if sport were not concerned with bringing about fairness sport would cease to be the practice it is and should be.[53]

Francis Keenan has put forward a similar position in his paper "Justice and Sport." Keenan argues that the context of rules and conditions in which sport contests occur must satisfy principles of justice and fairness if objectionable outcomes are to be at least minimized.[54] Keenan argues that in situations such as that found in sport, in which there are conflicting desires to obtain the spoils of victory and we cannot know who ought to win before undertaking the practice designed to determine a winner, the ideal of fairness is to "design a system which ensures as nearly as possible, that the outcome of the game is just whatever it happens to be."[55] Thus, he states that essential to fairness in sport is the "development, regulation, administration and enforcement of a system of rules designed to establish and maintain justice."[56] Although not all sport rules are directed at the establishment and maintenance of justice, in what follows it will be shown that Keenan's contention that procedures relating to both the internal and external affairs of sport have been developed to ensure a fair result is accurate.

It is not enough to ensure a fair outcome that the procedural rules of a practice are applied impartially and consistently whatever their substantive principles. It is a part of the very concept of a practice governed by rules that similar cases should be treated as they arise but that is not enough to guarantee substantive justice. This is dependent upon the principles in accordance with which the practice is designed.[57] Impartial adherence to the procedures established for sport can only ensure a just outcome if they themselves define a basic structure which is just. Thus, acceptance of the claim that procedures overseeing both the internal and external affairs of sport ensure a fair result is dependent upon an acceptance of the principles these procedures are structured around as principles directed at a fair outcome.

The procedures Keenan alludes to are embedded in the constitutive rules of sport which define and regulate sport contests and in administrative rules and regulations which oversee practices such as recruiting of athletes and scheduling contests. Constitutive rules typically specify a special area in which the contest is to take place, its duration, a specific state of affairs to be achieved by contestants (e.g. crossing a finish line), the means used to achieve that goal (prescriptive rules), the allowable equipment, the scoring system, and forbidden actions and regulations specifying a prescribed penalty if those are violated (proscriptive rules).[58] The aspects covered by the constitutive rules of sport indicated that these rules serve at least three functions. Firstly, they define a particular sport; basketball, hocky, tennis, high jumping and so on are specifc types of contests as defined by the constitutive rules governing them. Secondly, in defining a specific goal and specifying both a range of allowable means and actions forbidden as a means for achieving that goal, constitutive rules specify a range of skills which are to be contested and specify what it is to win a contest. Thirdly, constitutive rules are meant to regulate the action of play found in a particular occurrence of a sport contest. From the foregoing discussion of constitutive rules, it can be stated that constitutive rules define a specific sport contest in which one or more human participants oppose at least one other to seek the mutual appraisal of relative abilities of all participants to utilize bodily moves which exhibit developed motor skills, physiological and psychological endurance.[59] Specific sports are thus best understood as particular contests in which an appraisal of particular abilities is the criterion by which a winner is determined and the spoils of victory are acquired.

Fairness in sport is commonly equated with playing in accordance with the rules. The ethical principles upon which the rules are based, however, are rarely discussed. Once these principles are understood it can be shown that in playing fair participants are not only not acting selfishly, but are upholding an obligation essential to the establishment of moral relations among competitors in sport.

In his paper "Sport as Fairness" Arnold attempts to uncover the ethical principles upon which the rules of sport are based through an explication of the contention that sport is a practice concerned with justice as fairness. Arnold suggests that fairness in sport is best understood in terms of two principles of freedom and equality.[60] He states that the position that sport is concerned with the idea of justice as fairness presupposes that:

> individuals want to come together to participate and practice the various forms of sport because they find them in the broad context of their lives in some way worthwhile. When a player therefore enters a sport he has already made a judgment about its value and overtly or tacitly agrees to enter it as a free and rational being.[61]

It is in this way that Arnold contends that a principle of freedom applies to sport and is connected to an understanding of sport as fairness. According to Arnold a competitor who of his/her own free will chooses to enter the practice of sport, knowing what the practice involves, voluntarily enters into an agreement to participate in a way the rules of that sport lay down.[62]

The idea of mutual agreement to abide by the rules is essential to the idea of fairness. In his paper "Justice as Fairness," John Rawls states that the question of fairness arises when free persons engage in a joint activity and amongst themselves settle or acknowledge the rules defining the activity and the allocation of prescriptive shares in the benefits and burdens.[63] In regard to the connection between mutual acknowledgement of principles by free persons and fairness, Rawls states that this is what connects the concept of fairness to justice and is essential to the development of a "true community between persons in their common practices; otherwise their relations will appear to them to be founded to some extent on force.[64]

Participants will accept a practice as fair according to Rawls if:

> none feels that by participating in it, they or any of the others are taken advantage of, or forced to give in to claims which they do not regard as legitimate.[65]

As Rawls notes, this implies that each participant has a conception of legitimate claims which it is reasonable for others as well as himself to acknowledge.[66]

The contention that the procedural rules governing sport are concerned with fairness is then a claim that they uphold principles which free and rational beings would mutually acknowledge as legitimate claims within a competitive activity as the various forms of sport are competitive activities in which relative abilities to perform certain skills are contested and an essential part of participating in sport is thus a will to compete or contest one's abilities.

As noted earlier, Arnold suggests that fairness in sport is concerned with equality as well as freedom.[67] In regard to a principle of equality being related to fairness in sport Arnold states that the rational agent as player will have made a commitment about equality of treatment in advance of participation.[68]

According to Arnold, this commitment underlies the participant's acceptance of the rules as being

> in the interest of all players and that it is part of the expected practice of sport that they will be impartially applied so that one player or team will not gain unfair advantage over another.[69]

If an impartial application of the rules governing sport is to guarantee that neither of the opposing sides will gain a special advantage, the procedural rules must themselves guarantee an equal treatment of all participants such that none are given an unfair advantage. A commitment to equality of treatment is the fundamental ethical principle upon which sport rules are based.

In choosing to enter into the competitive activity of sport, rational agents qua players can be presumed to find the challenge posed by competitors and the activity of competition worth pursuing. The procedural rules governing a competitive practice such as sport will then be accepted as fair by participants if and only if participants feel that by entering into the arrangement their interests in contesting are given the same regard as the interests of others. Consequently, a competitive structure in which contestants are not ensured the same opportunity to contest their abilities would not be acceptable to participants as such an arrangement would fail to respect their choice to contest relative abilities. Further, as in sport winners are to be determined according to a determination of relative abilities through contesting Meakin's contention that fairness in sport is dependent upon the provision of a fair opportunity to win accurately captures the essense of fairness in sport.

Sport is in fact an activity concerned with fairness as suggested by Meakin as procedural rules governing the competitive process are directed at the provision of an equitable opportunity to contest one's abilities and consequently to win.

Fundamental to the insurance of a fair opportunity to win is a set of rules which focus upon the determination of a victor according to a fair determination of ability. A fair determination of ability is dependent upon the rules defining at least the range of abilities which are being appraised and upon the same abilities being ascribed to each participant so that a determination of relative abilities is possible. A racket sport whose constitutive rules stipulate that whichever player serves first can only use a forehand stroke for the remainder of play while his opponent can use either a forehand or backhand stroke would not be fair as it would not allow for a determination of relative ability at the same skills. As was noted in the previous discussion of constitutive rules, these rules clearly demonstrate an interest in ensuring that victory is determined by ability. In clearly stating a specific goal and the kinds of actions which can or must be utilized in achieving this goal, the rules of sport specify a set of positively constitutive skills and tactics of a sport.[70] Further, in proscribing certain actions they attempt to reduce or eliminate certain actions so that the participants face the same test by assuring a test of known skills.[71]

In addition to constitutive rules which clearly imply an intent to guarantee that all participants face the same test, the procedures governing sport contests are replete with additional procedures aimed at ensuring participants a fair opportunity to win according to ability. A sampling of these follows.

Efforts to ensure a semblance of equality between opposing sides in an attempt to equalize the contest before it occcurs are a notable feature of sport. John Loy suggests that "these efforts typically focus on matters of size, skill, and experience".[72] He offers the following examples to illustrate attempts to estabish equality based on size: the formation of leagues according to size and the designation of weight classes for wrestlers and boxers.[73] As illustrations of efforts to bring about equality on the basis of skill and experience he offers these examples: the establishment of handicaps for bowlers and golfers, the designation of various levels of competition such as junior varsity and varsity in scholastic athletics, and drafting procedures found in professional sports.[74] These procedures illustrate how administrative bodies often develop administrative rules in addition to constitutive rules defining a sport to ensure a fairness in contests.

As carefully as one tries to bring about equality through these procedures absolute equality will not always be realized. Roger Caillos observes that various factors may hinder attempts to bring about an initial position of absolute equality. He lists the following factors as ones whose influence may be considerable: the fact of having the sun in front or in back; the wind which aids or hinders one or the other side; the fact, in disputing for position on a circular track of being in the inside or outside lane.[75] Procedural rules have been put in place to counter these advantages to the extent possible so that the determination of relative ability is not unduly influenced by arbitrary and privileged advantage. Accordingly, lots are drawn to determine lane positions in races, coins are flipped or rackets are spun to determine who will initiate an offensive attack and the side losing the spin or toss is compensated by having the right to chose which half of the court or field they will start play on. As Fraleigh states, these actions are not simply conventional actions but are actions exhibiting a continued effort of trying to maintain equal opportunity for all participants.[76]

Another explicit feature of sport is that they usually have a definite criterion for determining a winner. The rules and procedures specifically concerned with the determination of a winner also demonstrate a concern with maintaining an equality of opportunity. Loy observes that in competitions where the stakes are high "a series of contests is held between opponents in an effort to rule out the element of chance and decide the winner on the basis of merit".[77] This demonstrates an interest both in equality of opportunity to win and an interest in merit being the basis of deciding a winner as a team which beats an opponent once by a narrow margin may be lucky, if it repeatedly beats the opponent then it is more clearly the better team.[78] This concern is further illustrated by the example put forward by Fraleigh of the option of setting or not setting a badminton game when a tie occurs at either 13 or 14 points.[79] Fraleigh notes that badminton rules provide this option because:

> In any contest that becomes tied either one or two points away from its normal completion, it is obvious that neither player has demonstrated markedly greater ability to that point and, since only the server may score points in badminton, being the server is at a distinct advantage.[80]

The nonserving side's option to extend the contest at this point by two or three points is an attempt to equalize chances of winning by diminishing the advantage of the server by giving the other side the opportunity to calculate what choice is to their advantage.[81]

The foregoing examples demonstrate that a concern for justice as fairness is built into sport. The existence of these procedures does not however in itself guarantee that the outcome of a particular sport contest will be fair. This is of course dependent upon these procedures being adhered to by those involved in a particular contest.

Arnold argues that participants are morally obligated to act in accordance with the rules of sport when they accept its rules as "equally binding upon them so that they have no complaint against them as being unfair".[82] This obligation has been put forward by Rawls as the duty of fair play. According to Rawls, when individuals voluntarily engage in a practice according to rules, they restrict their liberty as the rules will often be at odds with their interests in the sense that they will be required to forego particular advantages which the peculiarities of their circumstances might permit them to take.[83] Subsequently, those who have submitted to these restrictions when required have the right to a similar acquiescence on the part of those who have benefited from their submission. Thus, if the participants in a practice accept its rules as fair there arises a prima facie duty of the parties to each other to act in accordance with the practice when it falls upon them to comply.[84]

Engaging in the practice of sport and accepting its benefits is a voluntary action. Further, there is a necessary submission of liberty in accepting the joint undertaking as the rules of sport clearly place restrictions upon the participants' freedom to choose means towards the goal of a particular sport. Each player would then appear to be bound by a prima facie duty to comply with the rules.

It has been argued that the procedural rules of sport are, at least in part, directed at the establishment of an equal opportunity to contest one's abilities. This was stated to be essential to fairness in sport as sport contestants will accept the procedural rules as fair if and only if they establish an equality of treatment in the form of equal opportunity to contest. Underlying this contention is the notion that in entering into sport as a free person, knowing what the practice involves, contestants must enter sport with a belief that the competitive process or challenge imposed by one's opponent is worth pursuing as an essential part of participating in sport is a will to compete or contest one's abilities. The establishment of equal opportunity to contest one's abilities can then be said to be grounded on a principle of respecting the choice of contestants to form and act upon a conception of how they should pursue their interests and develop their capacities. Equal opportunity to contest one's abilities in sport is then essential to the treatment of sport participants as equals. Treating others as equals is to treat them with equal respect, or "as human beings who are capable of forming and acting upon intelligent conceptions of how their lives should be lived"[85] and with equal concern or "as human beings who are capable of suffering and frustration."[86] Playing fair or adhering to the duty of fair play in sport can thus be said to be ground on a principle of respecting one's opponents as persons.

As Rawls notes, playing fair is thus, "a reflection in each person of the recognition of the aspirations and interests of others to be realized by their joint activity."[87] Further, a failure to play fair may reflect a failure to recognize each other as a person and to treat others as an object as Rawls suggests.[88] To treat others as an object is to treat them as a means to one's own ends and to disregard their desires, interests, aspirations and capacity to formulate and pursue a plan to fulfill these. Playing fair is then necessary to the establishment of moral relations in sport and an essential part of sportsmanship.

Fairness and Selfishness

Given the foregoing discussion it would thus be odd, as Meakin argues, to call a competitor selfish if he plays fairly for by playing fairly he shows a regard for his opponent's interests which is a mark of unselfishness.[89] Participation in sport does not then necessitate acting as a rational egoist as insinuated by those who object to the competitive nature of sport. As noted above, playing fair implies a constraint on self-interest in particular cases and thus enjoins conduct which a rational eogist would not decide upon. This constraint is founded upon a recognition that all participants ought to be treated fairly and given a fair opportunity to contest their abilities. Competitors who accept the duty of fair play or who recognize their opponents as persons with similar interests and capacities to themselves and play fair out of this recognition cannot be said to be acting out of a selfish disregard for others.

Meakin offers two further arguments to show that playing fair is not selfish. Firstly, he argues that part of the very point of sport participation is to agree to put one's interest at stake and accordingly that neither side can be deemed selfish for taking up the challenge and trying their utmost to win by fair means.[90] It was noted in discussing sport as fairness that sport is a contest of mutual abilities and that procedural rules designed to ensure that victory is determined by a fair determination of ability are part of the practice of sport. Part of what sport is about is then putting one's interests in winning at stake and accepting the contest itself as a fair means for determining victory. Thus, if contestants play fair, no party should have reason to feel that their interests have not been given fair regard.

Secondly, Meakin argues that competitors who play fair are giving each other a good game and this can better be termed conferment of mutual benefit rather than selfishness.[91] Thus he states:

> by trying their best to win by fair means competitors are offering their opponents the opportunity of enjoyment and satisfaction (e.g. the thrill of meeting a challenge, the joy of playing skillfully and as hard as possible, the pleasure involved in the pursuit and attainment of excellence, and so on).[92]

Meakin acknowledges that he may be offering an all too rosy picture of sport as although competitors do give their opponents a good game while doing their best to win and by playing fairly, they rarely do so consciously and often do so only as a means to achieving victory.[93]

In the foregoing it was suggested that in playing fair competitors show a regard for their opponents' interests if they play fair out of a recognition of their opponents as persons with similar interests and capacities or out of an acceptance of a duty of fair play. Meakin's later comments demonstrate that contestants who play fair do not necessarily do so out of a moral motive. This point will be returned to and explored further in a discussion of moral motivation and sportsmanship.

CHAPTER FIVE

Sportsmanship as Moral Conduct in Sport

In this chapter the types of acts essential to the establishment of moral relations among competitors in sport will be explored. In the preceding chapter the contention that competitors are necessarily acting against morality because the act of competing is inherently selfish was addressed. It was argued that sport contestants who adhere to the duty of fair play are not acting selfishly. It was argued that playing fair is not only not selfish but is in fact essential to the establishment of moral relations among competitors. In the first section of this chapter, the types of acts which are essential to playing fair will be addressed.

In discussing fair play in the previous chapter it was argued that underlying fairness in sport is a concern that contestants be treated as equals. Treating persons as equals was related to being treated with equal respect and being treated with equal concern. Fair play in sport was explained in terms of contestants being treated with equal respect. The possible relationship between being treated with equal concern and moral obligation for sport particpants has thus far eluded comment. In the second section of this chapter the significance of treating others as beings capable of experiencing harm and frustration to sportsmanship will be explored.

Fair Play

Playing fair is frequently equated with playing in accordance with the rules. Rule violations may occur either intentionally or unintentionally. Arnold suggests that "acting unfairly arises not so much from the accidental transgression of the rules so much as in the deliberate breaking of them"[1] as intentional breaking of the rules is done with the intent of gaining unfair advantage. Unintentional rule violations may occur either because a player does not know the rules or accidentally and cannot be entirely avoided.[2] A contestant may in fact be attempting to play fairly and to offer his opponent full opportunity to contest his abilities in a fair and well played contest, yet unintentionally violate the rules for one of the foregoing reasons. Such a contestant would not be held morally blameworthy for transgressing the rules and failing to respond appropriately to the interests and capacities of his opponent. However, such rule violations may significantly affect the fairness of the contest, particularly if they go undetected or occur frequently. Fraleigh illustrates this point with the example of a golfer continually improving the lay of his ball because he doesn't know the rules.[3] This would alter the fairness of the contest as not all contestants would be facing the same test of playing the ball from wherever it lands, be that a good or bad position.

Although unintentional violations are not indicative of unsportsmanlike behavior, it is incumbrant upon coaches and educators to attempt to reduce the occurrence of unintentional violations as they can significantly alter a contest. Accidental rule violations are essentially errors in skill performance and their frequency can be reduced to an insignificant level by precontest practice.[4] The occurrence of unintentional violations due to a lack of knowledge of the rules can similarly be reduced by precontest study.[5]

In contrast to unintentional violations, intentional violations are morally blameworthy in that the player transgressing the rules intends to gain an unfair advantage. Intentional violations are however of two kinds and it is not unanimously agreed by all that both types constitute a failure to play fair. Fraleigh captures the essence of these two types of violations in the following statement:

> One is a conscious violation wherein the player expects to be caught but is willing to be penalized in order to attain some tactical advantage the violation affords. A second kind occurs when a player deliberately violates a rule but hopes not to be detected in the violation and, thus escape the penalty.[6]

The first kind of intentional violation alluded to by Fraleigh is commonly referred to as the professional foul. This type of violation is not thought by all to be antagonistic to fair play or to be a blameworthy act. This type of violation will be addressed after consideration of the second type of intentional violation alluded to by Fraleigh.

The second kind of intentional violation is what is commonly known as cheating and is conventionally accepted as antagonistic to fairness in sport. Cheating is defined by Fraleigh as the "deliberate violation of the rules to gain advantage while avoiding a penalty so that the opponents are not now facing the same test".[7] Fraleigh has built into his definition of cheating the reasoning by which cheating is antagonistic to fairness in sport. It was noted in the foregoing chapter that fairness in sport is dependent upon adherence to a rule structure which is itself directed at the fair treatment of all participants. This fair treatment is directed at equal regard being given to the interests of all through an equal opportunity to contest their abilities. Fundamental to this is the fact that all contestants must be contesting the same abilities so that relative abilities can be determined. Cheating is then antagonistic to the establishment of equal opportunity to contest one's abilities and correspondingly antagonistic to moral relations in sport. Cheating is a moral concern as it is an exploitation of those who compete in good faith.[8] Cheating represents a denial of the implicit promise made by participants to accept the restrictions upon their liberty set down by the rules which have been accepted by their opponents. The reneging of this agreement in order to enhance the possbility of winning is a moral concern not only because it involves the breaking of an implicit contract but because it represents a failure to respect their opponents' right to an equal opportunity to contest their relative abilities. This is in turn a failure to treat one's opponents as persons possessing similar interests and capacities and represents an unjustifiable interference with their attempt to pursue a rational plan to contest their abilities. Cheating is then a moral concern, antagonistic to moral relations in sport and contrary to sportsmanship.

The relationship between morality and the "professional foul" or deliberate rule violations of rules in which the violator expects a penalty to be assessed is widely debated. In fact, it is argued by several commentators that the professional foul is an acceptable tactical strategy which can be considered part of the game. Suits is a proponent of this position. The nature of this position is captured by

Suits' comments about proscriptive rules. In regard to proscriptive rules he states:

> [This] is the kind of rule whose violation results in a fixed penalty, so that violating the rules is neither to fail to play the game nor (necessarily) to fail to play the game well, since it is sometimes tactically correct to incur such a penalty (e.g., in hockey) for the sake of the advantage gained. But these rules and lusory consequences of their violation are established by the rules and are simply extensions of them.[9]

In opposition to his position is the position that these types of violations like cheating are designed to interfere with the purpose of the game and thus destroy the contest itself. Pearson captures this position in stating that:

> a particular game is defined by its rules - ...the rules of a game are a definition of that game. If this is the case, a player who deliberately breaks the rules of the game is deliberately no longer playing that game.[10]

The focus of the debate amongst commentators who hold these opposing positions has been upon whether or not the professional foul can be said to be a part of the contest or whether it represents a breakdown of the contest itself. Little commentary has been made as to whether this tactic is a moral or immoral one.

The position put forward by Suits is an accepted attitude among contemporary sport participants. The one exception to general approval of the professional foul as an acceptable tactical play is intentional personal fouling of an opponent which intends injury. Fraleigh objects to this position in a discussion of rules and their function in his book, Right Actions in Sport. His argument successfully places the professional foul outside the realm of playing fair by showing such violations do affect the fairness of a contest in the same way as cheating.

Fraleigh's position evolves from an understanding of the role constitutive rules play in defining a goal and acceptable means for achieving that goal in a particular sport. As was described in the foregoing chapter, one function of constitutive rules of sport is to ensure that all contestants face the same test and are given equal opportunity to contest their abilities. This contention forms the crux of Fraleigh's argument. Constitutive rules serve this function by defining: a specific goal to be achieved by contestants; positive injunctions specifying constitutive skills and tactics; proscriptions of action by identifying specific actions that are illegal and inappropriate. As proscriptive rules are those which are connected to a penalty for violation, what is at issue in the debate over the appropriateness and morality of the tactical use of professional fouls is whether the combination of proscriptive rule-violation and the accompanying assessment of the corresponding penalty falls within the realm of fair play.

This tactic clearly falls outside of the realm of playing fair when the purpose of proscriptive rules is considered. Fraleigh suggests that "the spirit of those proscriptions is to help assure a contest of known skills and tactics by eliminating the use of certain inappropriate skills and tactics."[11] In support of this claim he notes that proscriptions have come about in two ways. Firstly, when particular sports were invented certain actions were prohibited to give the sport its character.[12] Secondly, new tactics and skills have at times been introduced by competitors and judged by sport organizations to represent "a threat to the letter and spirit of the positively constitutive skills and tactics or the prelusory goal of a sport"[13] and subsequently proscriptions have been written into the rules.

Proscriptive rules and the penalties attached to them are then intended to keep a particular sport a contest of a specific set of relative abilities. Fundamental to fairness in sport is an assurance that participants are contesting the same relative abilities. Proscriptive rules play a key role in ensuring this element of a fair contest. For example, proscriptive rules in basketball include proscriptions against holding, blocking, tripping and pushing.[14] Proscriptions against such actions are intended to ensure that such actions do not become skills of contesting. As Fraleigh states "the spirit of such rules is that intentional fouls are not part of the officially agreed upon skills and tactics of basketball".[15]

The deliberate breaking of rules, whether a penalty is sought or not, is then contradictory to fairness in sport and stands outside of playing fair. All intentional violations are a refusal of participants to restrict their liberty in ways implicitly agreed to in entering into a rule governed practice. Further, as was noted in regard to cheating, this is in turn a failure to treat one's opponents as persons. All intentional violations are therefore a moral concern and are contrary to sportsmanship.

The foregoing discussion of intentional rule violations highlights the fact that "acting fairly involves more than merely following the rules; it involves also a commitment to what they stand for in the name of what is fair".[16] As Arnold states in grasping the principle of fair play contestants

> will not only have adopted a common set of rules and their spirit but they will understand that it is only by practicing them that the aspirations and interests of others as well as themselves can be realized. They will have seen that to recognize another player as a person one must consider him and act towards him in certain ways.[17]

In regard to playing fair Rawls comments that more than simply being able to follow the rules is required.[18] In this vien he states that acting unfairly often involves

> taking advantage of loop-holes or ambiguities in rules, availing oneself of unexpected or special circumstances which make it impossible to enforce them, insisting that rules be enforced to one's advantage when they should be suspended and more generally, acting contrary to the intention of a practice.[19]

In general terms acting unfairly in sport, as in other practices, is to act against the intention of the practice. By this is meant that any action which is antagonistic to the intention of the procedural rules governing a practice, whether proscribed by the rules or not, stands outside of fair play. It has been argued that the procedural rules governing sport are, at least in part, directed at establishing a fair contest in which all participants are given a fair opportunity to contest their relative abilities. Underlying this, it has been suggested, is a contention that contestants ought to play the game with respect for others as persons.

Ways in which this can be undermined in any particular sport are too numerous to address. However, in order to develop good sportsmanship educators and coaches must take it upon themselves to analyze sports and the type of play which is likely to happen and establish in the minds of the players what is acceptable and unacceptable playing. The moral acceptability of actions in any given sport is at least in part dependent upon the action adhering to the ethical principle underlying constitutive rules. Thus, these principles can form a basis for determining immoral acts in sport. The following example of a tactic which can be said to be taking advantage of a loop-hole in the rules of hockey is offered as an example of how such an analysis can be made.

Taking advantage of loop-holes is a manipulation of the rules to one's advantage. An example of manipulating the rules to one's advantage is the deliberate knocking of one's own goal off the posts in hockey when there is a scramble in front of the net for the puck and one's goalie is being hampered in seeing where the puck is. As play will be stopped so that the goal can be refastened in place and consequently one's team is removed from a position of defensive disadvantage, this would be a manipulation of the rules in one's own favor. Such an action goes against fair play as it represents a failure to respond appropriately to one's opponent's demonstration of offensive skill with defensive skills. It is then a failure to respect the capacities of one's opponent and perhaps even of one's own teammates.

Beneficence and Sportsmanship

Playing fair is conventionally accepted as a necessary part of sportsmanship. This aspect of sportsmanship has been discussed at some length. It has been argued that underlying fair play in sport is a concern that all participants in sport be treated as equals. Treating others as equals has been said to involve firstly treating others with equal respect by treating them as human beings capable of formulating and acting upon a rational plan to fulfill their interests and capacities and secondly treating others with equal concern by treating them as beings capable of experiencing harm and frustration. Playing fair has been explicated in terms of treating others with equal respect. The concern to be addressed in this section is whether treating others with a concern for their welfare is also a fundamental part of sportsmanship.

Arnold has suggested that in addition to being concerned with fair play, sportsmanship is, at least in part, "a form of altruistically motivated conduct that is concerned with the welfare of another."[20] Arnold's brief discussion of this contention will be used in what follows as a starting point for discussion of sportsmanship and a concern for the welfare of participants in sport. In this discussion focus will be directed at the content he gives to altruistic sportsmanship and in the next chapter the focus he gives to motivation will be addressed.

Arnold states that altruism is best understood as

> forms of action and conduct that are not done merely because of what is fair and just in terms of playing fair and keeping to the rules but because there is a genuine concern or an interest in and concern for one's fellow competitors.[21]

Subsequently he suggests that altruistic forms of sportsmanship "stem from a desire for the other's good."[22] In this regard he comments that altruistic forms of sportsmanship are characterized by sympathy, compassion and concern "directed towards the other in virtue of his or her suffering, travail, misery or pain"[23] and that the altruistic sportsman "not only thinks about and is affected by the plight of the other, but acts in such a way that is directed to bring help or comfort in some way."[24]

Arnold's contention that what he terms altruistic forms of sportsmanship stem from a desire for the other's good suggests that he is at least in part concerned with showing benevolent acts to be a significant form of sportsmanship. William Frankena has argued that a complete theory of moral obligation must contain a principle of beneficence as well as a principle of justice. According to Frankena, the principle of justice "lays upon us the prima facie obligation of treating people equally"[25] and that treating people equally means making the same relative contribution to the goodness of their lives.[26] Playing fair in sport is related to justice.

The principle of beneficence is, according to Frankena, a prima facie obligation to do good and prevent harm.[27] Frankena suggests that beneficence is at least part of morality as not everything that is right is just, and not everything that is wrong is unjust.[28] He illustrates this point by stating that "incest, even if it is wrong, can hardly be called unjust. Cruelty to children may be unjust if it involves treating them differently from adults, but it is surely wrong anyway".[29]

Frankena suggests that four types of action fall under a principle of beneficence. He characterizes these as follows:

1. One ought not to inflict evil or harm.
2. One ought to prevent evil or harm.
3. One ought to remove evil.
4. One ought to do or promote good.[30]

As Frankena notes, being beneficent is not always considered obligatory. However, his contention that "it is certainly wrong at least prima facie to inflict evil or pain on anyone"[31] is certainly correct. To admit this is "to admit that the principle of beneficence is partly correct."[32] More specifically, to admit this is to admit that at least the first and very likely the second type of action Frankena alludes to as being related to a principle of beneficence are prima facie obligations. This admission can be stated as an acceptance of a prima facie duty of nonmaleficence if such is understood to prohibit actions intentionally injurious or cruel to another person.

As sport involves physical relations among people, in which there exists the potential for injury being inflicted, a principle of nonmaleficence would seem to be a prima facie obligation essential to the establishment of moral relations in sport. Fraleigh suggests that this is the case through his inclusion of a Guide for Noninjurious Action and a Guide for Nonharrassment as two of the five guides he believes to be necessary to the establishment of morality in sport.

Fraleigh's Guide of Noninjurious Acton requires that all sport participants avoid encouraging or performing acts which "injure, are detrimental to health, or unnecessarily increase the danger of injury or detriment to health of another person".[33] This guide prohibits physical violence if violence is understood to be the intentional use of physical force to harm a person. Violence is as indefensible in sport as in other contexts. Fraleigh appears to accept this as he suggests the Guide of Noninjurious Action proscribes against acts inherently dangerous such as tackling a soccer opponent from behind and tackling a football opponent by the head.[34] In defending the acceptability of constitutive skills, even though they include "violent bodily contact,"[35] Fraleigh must not mean by "violent bodily contact," contact which intends bodily harm. Furthermore, this comment implies that he accepts that an appropriate level of force directed towards others in performing constitutive skills such as body checking in hockey can be delineated.

This position is not accepted by all commentators on sport. Simon notes that to many critics contact sports such as hockey and football are morally unacceptable practices as they glorify violence and are to "American society what gladiatorial contests were to the Romans."[36] Simon argues that what needs clarification is then whether uses of force for strategic purposes are defensible.

As Simon notes, sports often do involve the use of force against opponents to achieve strategic goals. Participants of contact sports must then be "willing to take such a risk because they believe the risks are outweighed by the benefits."[37] Consequent to this point, Simon suggests that in drawing a reasonable line between violence and an acceptable use of force, the key ethical question is "whether the use of force in question takes unfair advantage of the vulnerability of one's opponents."[38] Thus Simon suggests what he terms the Vulnerability Principle as a possible grounds for determining an ethically defensible use of force. Simon's Vulnerablity Principle states:

> the use of force against an opponent in sport is ethically indefensibly just when the opponent's physical position or condition is such that no effective strategic response is possible and as a result it is highly likely that injury will result.[39]

Applying this principle to the strategic use of force in football, Simon argues that wearing down the opposition by the constant infliction of force is permissible if one's opponents are in a position to respond strategically with blocks and are not in an unusual position of physical risk, but actions such as a hit from the blind side of a receiver not the target of a pass is unjustifiable as unnecessary and the player being hit is in a position of vulnerability.[40]

Simon intends his Vulnerability Principle not only as a means for determining when a constitutive skill is performed in an unacceptably forceful way, but also as a means for determining when acts of physical intimidation or other interference not prescribed by the constitutive rules unnecesarily increase the possibility of injury. This type of action is described by Fraleigh as another type of action prohibited by an application of the principle of nonmaleficence to sport. Fraleigh puts forward the following examples as acts which would not be acceptable because they are performed soley for intimidation or interference: the brushback pitch in baseball, "sacking" the football quaterback just after he releases a pass, and going out of one's way to slide into the pivot man in a baseball double-play effort.[41]

Fraleigh's latter two examples fit Simon's Vulnerability Principle as the players interfered with are not in a position to make an effectively strategic response and as a result the likelihood of injury is increased. The acceptablility of the brushback pitch in baseball is more controversial.

Simon compares the acceptability of a brushback pitch to the acceptability of a beanball pitch. In applying the Vulnerability Principle to these two types of pitches Simon concludes that the beanball pitch is always ethically indefensible as a beanball thrown behind a batter's head takes advantage of the hitter's reflexes to move back from an inside pitch to inflict injury.[42] Such a pitch is clearly against the principle of nonmaleficence as the intent is more than to brush the batter off the plate and is likely to inflict injury. In regard to the brushback pitch, Simon's position would appear to be that depending upon the skill level of players, such a pitch may be strategically defensible. In this regard he notes that a brushback pitch might be ethically defensible when thrown in a major league game as batters at this level are supposed to have the reflexes to avoid such pitches, but ethically indefensible if thrown at a 50-year-old, out of shape businessman.[43] Simon's contention seems reasonable. It is this writer's belief, however, that potentially dangerous tactics such as the brushback pitch should not be encouraged unless it is reasonably certain that the skill and fitness level of contestants is developed enough to allow for effective responses to the tactic. Coaches and educators must then take an active role in determining the potential for strategic tactics to unnecessarily inflict harm and discourage any questionable tactics. As sport is to be a contest in which participants are to be respected and cared for as persons and is not to be an all out war, application of the Vulnerability Principle in determining defensible uses of force should then always be interpreted conservatively and on the side of safety for all participants.

Fraleigh suggests that a third class of acts are also proscribed by his guide of noninjurious action. This class he defines as "acts either inherently detrimental or possibly detrimental to the health status of others".[44] He includes under this class the administering of painkillers to mask the pain of an injury and the taking of performance enhancing drugs.[45] To the extent that these acts can be shown to be harmful to athletes they are not ethically defensible. The issues surrounding the right of sport administrative bodies to legislate against the voluntary use of potentially harmful practices is full of ethical questions beyond the scope of the present work.[46] However, where such practices have been prohibited by procedural rules governing a particular sport, the use of such drugs would clearly be contrary to playing fair in sport and contrary to the establishment of moral relations of mutual respect in sport.

Earlier it was suggested that Fraleigh's Guide of Nonharassement is also supported by the application of a principle of nonmaleficence to sport. The types of actions prohibited by this guide can be thought of as psychological violence which involves intentional abuse directed against a person. The following acts are prohibited by this guide: name-calling and taunting opponents or officials, gestures of disrespect, cheering or ridiculing the mistakes or poor plays of others, refusing to enter a contest because of prejudicial feelings towards one's opponents.[47] As such acts are a direct attack upon a person's sense of self-worth, they can be said to be potentially harmful in a significant way and to be a failure to treat all sports participants as persons.

The foregoing discussion suggests that actions falling under the first two classes of acts delineated by Frankena as acts falling under a principle of beneficence are essential to the establishment of moral relations among sport contestants. It is less clear that the actions falling under the other two classes of acts delineated by Frankena are similarly essential. These two classes are: firstly, that one ought to remove evil and secondly, that one ought to do or promote good.[48]

Arnold is particularly concerned with showing this first class of acts to be an important form of sportsmanship, if "acts which remove evil" are understood to be acts directed at bringing help or comfort in some way to others because of their suffering, travail, misery, or pain. Three examples of this type of acton are put forward by Arnold as examples of altruistic sportsmanship.

His first example is that of a marathon runner who at the cost of victory stops to help a fellow runner in a state of distress.[49] Although such an action would be morally praiseworthy, it is not clear that such actions are essential to the establishment of moral relations in sport. Firstly, because a sport contest is an "oppositional event in which opponents try to outdo each other at the same task, it would be inappropriate for a contestant to consider the opponent's good as more important."[50] Furthermore, the benevolent act described by Arnold can only be fulfilled by the contestant if he/she removes him/herself from the contest itself. This type of act cannot then be said to be essential to the establishment of moral relations among contestants within the contest. This type of act, however, may be thought by some to not only be morally praiseworthy but morally obligatory whether or not it necessitates a contestant's exit from the contest. Such a position reflects Suits' contention that sport rules are not ultimately binding and that other rules (i.e. moral rules) can always supercede the game rules.[51] This suggests that while all possible benevolent acts are not necessary for the establishment of moral relations in sport, the possiblity of serious injury should be taken into account by sport organizers to ensure that personnel are available to assist any contestants who require assistance.

The second example Arnold puts forward is a factual case of a contestant acting on behalf of another so that more good is brought about than if one had merely acted in accordance with the rules. His example is Meta Anteran's act of asking the presiding jury to give her opponent a longer rest period than is provided by the rules of long jump because she had just taken part in another event.[52] As Meta Anteran was leading the competition and the opponent she sought extra favor for was her strongest rival, this act was certainly altruistic as Anteran put her chances of winning at risk. However, it is questionable whether the granting of Anteran's request is the type of act which is essential to the establishment of moral relations in sport. In fact, as the contest in question involved more than the two competitors, this act would seem to go against playing fair when the interests of all competitors are taken into account. The rule prescribing a specific rest period between consequetive jumps is a rule intended to ensure that all completitors are facing the same test and given equal opportunity to win. While it might be argued that Anteran's rival was not facing the same test due to be being fatigued from another event, giving her special favor in this event would be unfair unless all contestants were given the same rest period. Furthermore, the condition of contestants at the time of a particular contest is part of what is being tested and thus should not be something which is taken into consideration unequally. In sport then, acts directed at the provision of greater good to one contestant can only be morally acceptable if they do not negate fair play as this is essential to moral relations in sport.

Arnold's third example is that of a fencer reaching out and trying to console a defeated and disappointed opponent.[53] This gesture can be thought of as an extension of Fraleigh's Guide for Sympathetic Regard which demands that those involved in sport should "act toward other participants in ways that exhibit sympathy for their unwarranted misfortunes".[54] The gesture described by Arnold goes beyond the demands of this guide as Fraleigh intends his guide to apply only to negative events that do not result from effective play by an opponent.[55] Further, Fraleigh contends that acts falling under this guide are not essential to moral relations in sport but good acts to do because they "influence a quality of relations among sport contestants that encourage them to maintain the moral equilibrium".[56] This type of act and those falling under the guides Fraleigh says are significant in encouraging moral relations in sport, while not essential to the relations between contestants being morally acceptable, are of interest to those wishing to develop moral conduct in sport. Thus, this type of act and other similar acts will be returned to in the next chapter.

The foregoing discussion leads this writer to the conclusion that beneficent acts directed at removing evil are not essential to the establishment of moral relations in sport if they are contrary to playing fair or, if they require one contestant to put his/her fair opportunity to contest his/her abilities at stake for the sake of another's good.

In regard to beneficent acts which are directed at the promotion of good, Frankena notes that in general it is most plausible to say that these are not strictly obligatory.[57] The following two reasons support this contention. Firstly, it is not always possible for one individual to be aware of what would constitute the furthering of another's good. Secondly, the promotion of another's good may necessitate an individual putting his own interests at stake for the interests of others and unless one is under an obligation through a prior agreement to do so this would require an individual to consider another's good as more important than one's own. This type of act would then also seem to be unnecesary for the establishment of moral relations in sport on the same grounds as acts directed at removing evil.

CHAPTER VI

Moral Motivation and Sportsmanship as an Educational Objective

Discussion of moral motivation is significant to the present work as the primary concern is to delineate the nature of sportsmanship so that a fuller understanding of the educational demands of the objective of developing sportsmanship can be more fully understood by educators. An understanding of moral motivation is significant to this discussion as the objective of developing sportsmanship is primarily directed at developing sport participants who are likely to act in a morally appropriate and praiseworthy way when participating in a sport contest. The connection drawn by commentators between the objective of developing sportsmanship and the development of moral character suggests that this objective is associated as much with the development of morally responsible sport participants as it is with the establishment of morally acceptable relations among sport participants. In discussing fair play in chapter four, it was noted that competitors might play fairly for reasons other than a desire that all competitors are treated fairly. Competitors might play fairly for a number of reasons including gaining recognition or reward from coaches who commend such behavior, avoiding punishment, or simply because they know no other way to play the game. None of these reasons for playing fairly are moral reasons. A moral reason for playing fairly would reflect a concern that sport participants be treated fairly.

If the educational objective of developing sportsmanship is concerned with developing morally responsible participants, who are motivated to play sport in a morally acceptable way, an understanding of moral motivation is primary to the development of educational programs directed at the achievement of this end.

In discussing sportsmanship as a form of altruism Arnold's concern is more than showing acts of a particular content (beneficent) to be a significant form of sportsmanship. He is clearly concerned with saying something about the motivation underlying acts of sportsmanship as he states "moral action in sport, like other actions, cannot be properly understood only by reference to their external form".[1] Specifically, he is interested in showing acts done from a motive of compassion and a genuine concern for another rather than from a motive of duty to be moral acts significant to moral relations in sport. He in fact states that acts "done only out of concern for another's good and for no other reason...are not only altruistic but exemplify the best traditions of sportsmanship".[2]

This contention will be examined in the following section. In this discussion the theory of moral motivation put forward by Debra Shogan in her book Care and Moral Motivation will be discussed in relation to morality in sport. It will be argued that Arnold may be right in suggesting that acts of sportmanship done from a genuine concern or care for those involved in the contest is the best tradition of sportmanship but wrong in associating this motive only with beneficent acts. Following this discussion some general educational suggestions based upon insights gained into sportsmanship will be presented.

Moral Motivation and Sportsmanship

In Care and Moral Motivation, Shogan connects the concept of care to motivation by the fact that to say that someone cares that something occurs is to say that he or she is motivated to bring it about.[3] In regard to being motivated to bring something about Shogan argues that a motivating reason to respond in a particular situation requires both beliefs and desires.[4] That is, one must have beliefs about how a particular result can be brought about in a particular situation and a desire to bring about this result. An agent who responds morally is one who has motivating reasons which are morally justifiable.

Shogan argues that a caring person will be confronted by two different types of moral situations,[5] situations in which the welfare of another is at stake because of some predicament or situation in which adjudication is not necessary to enhance their welfare and situations in which there is a conflict between sentient beings or between sentient beings and a standard and adjudication is required so that those involved are treated fairly.[6] A caring person in this latter type of situation will possess a desire that those involved are treated fairly.[7] Shogan notes that a caring person's desire that others be treated fairly will extend beyond those situations in which he/she is called to adjudicate conflicts. In this light she states that:

> A caring person is committed to conserving those institutions which function to treat others fairly; as well, a caring person is committed to change when change is necessary to achieve fair treatment.[8]

In the foregoing chapter it was argued that sport is a practice defined by constitutive rules which are, at least in part, designed to ensure that participants are fairly treated. It can then be stated that sport is the type of institution which a caring person would be committed to conserving.

In the foregoing chapter it was also argued that sport participants must uphold a prima facie duty of fair play and that this is essential to moral relations in sport. Playing fair was noted to include both playing according to the procedural rules which are directed at maintaining fair treatment of all participants by structuring sport so that all have a fair opportunity to contest their abilities and choosing strategic tactics which are not contrary to the maintenance of this fair opportunity and to the treatment of one's opponents as equals.

A caring sport contestant would be one who possesses motivating reasons for action constituted by beliefs about sport contests being a situation in which fair treatment is necessary, beliefs about how sport ought to be played if fair treatment of all contestants is to occur and a desire for the fair treatment of all contestants. Shogan argues that a caring person's desire for fair treatment will at times be a direct desire for the fair treatment of those in the situation in which fair treatment is required but at other times will be a desire to perform the duty of justice.[9] A contestant's desire for fair treatment of all contestants may be a desire that those involved in a particular contest be treated fairly or a desire to fulfill the obligation of the duty of fair play. A unique feature of Shogan's theory of moral motivation is the contention that a morality of character and a morality of duty are complementary. She argues that acting from a direct desire for the fair treatment of those involved in a situation where fair treatment is necessary is a more significant moral response than acting from a desire to fulfill the duty of justice (fair play in sport) as the response is directly concerned with others.[10] However, as it is not always possible for an individual to specifically desire the fair treatment of all individuals who should be treated fairly, a moral response motivated by duty can be acted upon in these situations.[11] It is in this way that acting from duty is complementary to acting from a direct care for specific individuals in Shogan's theory.

The suggestion that in acting fairly a caring person can act either from duty or from a direct desire for the fair treatment of those involved in a sport contest is contrary to the position Arnold would appear to be putting forward in discussing sportsmanship as a form of altruism. Arnold would seem to be suggesting that those aspects of sportsmanship which are to do with fairness are motivated by duty as he connects fairness in sport to a Kantian view. In this vien, he states he is interested in showing

> the differences between the Kantian view of morality and those aspects of morality and sportsmanship that place greater emphasis upon the importance of personal and particular relationships.[12]

He proceeds to connect benevolent acts with genuine concern for others and makes no reference of a possible connection between fairness and genuine concern of others.

Arnold correctly asserts that being fair is connected to being impartial, but this does not negate the possibility of acting from a genuine concern for those involved in a situation demanding fair treatment. As Shogan notes "impartiality does not demand indifference"[13] and "the significance of a moral response will depend upon the actual desires that the moral agent has for those qua others in a moral situation."[14] What is demanded in treating others fairly is, according to Shogan, that one is impartial to features which are irrelevant to the resolution of a conflict and partial to others as sentient beings.[15] The partiality to other sentient beings Shogan alludes to as "a partiality which reflects connections to others who are affected by conflict."[16] She further notes that this would be reflected in the reasons a person would give in adjudicating a conflict and that a partial adjudicator would provide reasons reflecting interconnections.[17]

Impartiality to features which are irrelevant to the determination of a winner by contesting of relative abilities in a sport contest is built into the procedural rules of sport. By accepting these procedural rules and acting in accordance with them and choosing tactics which are not contrary to the intent of these rules sport participants are then acting in accordance with the dictates of impartiality demanded by fairness. Playing fairly can also reflect a partiality to those involved in sport as it is one way in which the recognition of others as persons with similar capacities and interests is demonstrated. However, contestants do not necessarily play fairly from a direct desire for another's fair treatment qua person.

A contestant who is partial to those involved qua sentient beings would play fairly because of a genuine concern that those involved are treated as persons deserving fair treatment. The recognition of one's opponents as persons is then fundamental to a direct desire for the fair treatment of those involved in sport. As was noted in chapter four, commentators have often reflected that contestants would appear not to recognize their opponents as persons as their actions toward them seem more reflective of treating them as obstacles.

Contestants do not, however, necessarily view their opponents as either obstacles or enemies engaged in all-out warfare. In fact an orientation towards competition which reflects a recognition of others as persons is possible. In discussing relations between opponents in sport, Fraleigh outlines two possible orientations to competition. Firstly, competition can be viewed as "an attempt to get or keep any valuable thing either to the exclusion of others or in greater measure than others."[18] Fraleigh associates this orientation with the belief among competitors that opponents are obstacles standing in the way of one's competitive desire.[19] A probable consequence of this orientation to competition is that competitors view the competitive activity only in terms of their individual goals and not as a means of mutual satisfaction.[20] In other words, the value orientation of competitiors who take part in competitions with this understanding is likely that of the Lombardian ethos - winning is the only thing. Fraleigh further suggests that under this view the atmosphere is likely to be one of hostility as opponents are perceived to be preventing each other from achieving their goal of winning.[21] A high occurrence of hostility among sport competitors under the prevailing Lombardian ethos is in fact the basis of much of the objection raised against sport.

In contrast to this understanding of competition is an understanding of competition as "an attempt to perform the same skillful actions better than opponents in order to express and develop competence."[22] As Fraleigh suggests, this view of competition "binds opponents together as mutual facilitators and enablers."[23] As the performance of skillful actions better than another is dependent upon two opposing sides performing the same skillful action, opponents under this orientation to competition are interdependent upon each other. The goal of each side, to perform a set of skills better than another, can only be attained if opponents desire this same goal. Further, in competitions such as sport contests in which the opposing sides directly contest against each other, opponents actually facilitate each other by playing well and drawing out the best performance each side is capable of. Under this orientation to competition, the value orientation of competitors is not likely that of the Lombardian ethos. Competitors who compete with this understanding will value the challenge of the process of competing as much, if not more, than winning the competition. Fraleigh suggests that under this orientation "the atmosphere between opponents is more likely to be one of mutual respect because of mutual interdependence."[24]

This latter contention is supported by Simon's comments that competition in sport is a paradigm case of an activity in which the participants treat each other as equals.[25] As Simon contends in sport

> each competitor must respond and react to the actions of other persons - actions which manifest the skills the

> participants have chosen to develop and the decisions they have made during play.[26]

Thus, Simon suggests that good competitiors do not see their opponent as a thing to be overcome but "as a person whose activity calls for appropriate response."[27] This leads Simon to speculate that competition in sport may in fact presuppose equal respect for persons.[28]

Proceeding from the previous discussion of fairness in sport, it is apparent that in responding to one's competitors as persons whose activity calls for appropriate response, one must respond with actions within the boundaries defined by fair play if one is to respond in a way displaying equal respect for persons. An orientation towards competition in sport in which the rational choice of all participants to contest relative abilities is seen as being interdependent upon the actions of others for fulfillment may, however, play a role in increasing the likelihood of fair play occurring out of mutual respect as this orientation to competition emphasizes an orientation towards participants as persons whose interests are interdependent.

Playing sport with this recognition and with an attitude of mutual respect is not dependent upon competitors not desiring victory. The possibility of competitors valuing both the challenge of the competitive process and victory is captured by the value orientation towards sport which Jack Scott has called the radical ethic. Scott describes the orientation of the radical ethic as one in which contestants have an intense desire to achieve excellence and victory, but just as intensely want to seek out and experience the antagonistic struggle.[29] He further notes that the most fundamental aspect of this orientation is the view that competitors possess of their opponents. He describes this attitude as follows:

> The opponent is not simply an obstacle in the way of victory; he is not simply an instrument to be used for one's glory. In a real sense, the opponent is a brother who is presenting you with a challenge.[30]

The radical ethos described by Scott and the second orientation to competition in sport described by Fraleigh have much in common. Both suggest that the process as well as the end of winning can be valued by participants. There is also an agreement that when the process is given value the relationship between opponents changes from one of hatred in which others are treated as obstacles to one of mutual respect in which others are treated as persons. Both suggest that under the orientation to competition in sport, mutual respect grows from a recognition of an interdependency of opposing sides to each other. Further, both suggest that this recognition is likely to enhance moral relations among sport participants. Scott captures this contention when he suggests that a consequence of this orientation will be "a minimization of alienation accompanied by a guidance of behavior by a general ethic of sportsmanship."[31] Such an orientation may in fact increase the likelihood of participants being motivated to play fairly out of a direct concern that those involved in a sport contest be treated fairly as this type of orientation lends itself to the recognition of those involved as persons whose interests are similar to one's own.

Any orientation which is likely to produce an atmosphere in which contestants are more likely to be treated morally is significant to educators desiring moral relations in sport. An orientation in which it is more likely that moral acts are motivated by a direct concern for or an interest in all others involved is of particular importance to educators if moral acts motivated by a direct concern are morally more significant as Shogan has suggested.

Both the claim that a particular orientation to competition in sport is likely to increase moral responses and the claim that moral responses within a particular framework are more likely to be motivated by a direct concern for others would need to be substantiated by empirical research. What can be said philosophically is that theoretically such an orientation contains elements which suggest this would not be farfetched and thus that this is worthy of further investigation. Determination of the truth of the latter claim, that such an orientation may increase the likelihood of moral responses motivated by a direct concern for those involved is dependent upon an ability to determine the underlying motive of the moral agents involved. This cannot be determined simply by observing behavior as playing fairly is the same whether done for duty or done from a direct concern that others be treated fairly.

Contained within Shogan's discussion of moral motivation are two possible ways by which the motive underlying the fair treatment of others might be discerned. Firstly, as noted previously, she suggests that adjudicating reasons are likely different when a response is motivated by a direct concern and when it is motivated by duty. Her suggestion is that the adjudicating reasons underlying a directly caring response is likely to reflect interconnections. In sport, in treating each other fairly contestants do not directly adjudicate a conflict, rather they are participating directly in an activity in which fairness is essential and is dependent upon them playing fairly in the ways highlighted in the last chapter. Determination of a sport participant's motive is thus more difficult to determine during play. However, given Shogan's contention, if a contestant was asked why he or she played fairly, a contestant motivated directly would offer reasons reflecting interconnections. If her contention is correct this would then lend credence to the speculation that education in the 'radical ethos' of sport participation might enhance the likelihood of direct moral responses as supporters of this orientation to sport draw a connection between a recognition of an interdependence between opponents and the likelihood of mutual respect.

The second way Shogan suggests that the motive underlying a moral response can be discerned is by the display of emotion which accompanies it. Shogan suggests that the experience of a caring emotion is a necessary result of caring that someone is treated fairly.[32] In this light, she states that a "caring emotion is conceptually connected to motivating reasons; it is a part of a caring response; and it is morally significant to a recipient of a response."[33]

Shogan illustrates the connection between emotional experience and caring as follows:

> If someone does not receive fair treatment when fair treatment is desired ... a caring person will experience either disapointment or anger, depending on the severity of the situation. If the other person receives fair

> treatment, a caring person experiences either satisfaction or joy.[34]

This type of emotional experience is, according to Shogan, significant to the recipient "because if properly displayed, it is an indication that the person who responds actually desires the recipient's fair treatment."[35]

Shogan's contention is that an appropriate display of emotional experience is what is significant. In regard to an appropriate display of emotion Shogan notes only that excessive experience of emotion which interferes with a moral response or a display which does not sincerely convey caring desires are inappropriate.[36] In sport it is not only important that excessive displays of emotion not interfere in a moral response but also that they not disrupt the ongoing play.

In regard to an appropriate display of moral emotions in sport, the types of acts Fraleigh includes under what he classifies as Supererogatory Guides may in fact represent appropriate displays of moral emotions. In regard to these guides Fraleigh comments that in general acts adhering to these guides "establish a quality of relationships among participants that make it unlikely the primary guides and ends [acts essential to moral relations in sport] will be violated."[37] Although these guides are not concerned with extraordinary acts in which agents perform acts which entail risks or losses to themselves, Fraleigh describes these guides as supererogatory guides because the types of acts he is concerned with cannot be "required of agents because such compulsion would falsify the nature of the act itself."[38] He further notes that the types of acts he is concerned with are

> performed freely by an agent who, at the least, equates the good of other agents to his/her own and, at the most, considers it paramount. Agents who benefit from such freely performed acts recognize them as acts of a considerate person since they are not required by duty or obligation.[39]

The types of acts placed under these guides are then supererogatory, according to Fraleigh, because they are not required by duty. He further contends that because they are not required and freely done they will enhance moral relations in sport because the recipients recognize them as free acts equating their good with the agents good and will thus respond by playing in a morally acceptable way. The freeness of these acts might, however, more appropriately be said to be an indication of a direct moral response to others involved in sport rather than a manifestation of doing more than one is morally obliged to do as many of the acts can be said to represent an appropriate display of moral emotion in sport by a caring person.

Under a guide Fraleigh refers to as the Guide of Mutual Respect, he places those acts which demonstrate a trust and confidence in others "sometimes by doing something and sometimes by refraining."[40] Under this guide he places acts such as: a raquetball player accepting an opponent's call of a hinder without any displeasure verbally or nonverbally with the opponent and the call; not demonstrating disgust at calls made by the officials against one's team, calming down other players who are demonstrating negatively against officials' calls; protesting only against obviously bad calls in a calm way.[41] This type of behavior can be seen as an appropriate display of satisfaction when fair treatment is occurring through appropriate play and application of the rules upon which fairness in sport is dependent. Other ways in which such satisfaction might be shown would be verbally acknowledging a good call by officials even if it was against one's team by a statement such as "fair call" or shaking hands at the end of the game and thanking one's opponents and the officials for a well-played and fair game. Fraleigh includes these types of acts under his Guide of Positive Recognition. Under this guide he also includes acts of verbal and nonverbal acknowledgment of good play by one's opponents as well as one's teammates. Although these displays of satisfaction are not directly connected to fair treatment, they do demonstrate a contestant's interest in meeting a challenge from their opponents in a respectful and appreciative manner and may then be another appropriate display of emotion which shows a regard for other contestants. As Fraleigh notes, such behavior shows an appreciation of good skill performance, intelligent tactics, and actions in accord with the letter and spirit of rules.[42]

Under a guide of Sympathetic Regard Fraleigh includes gestures showing sympathy for opponents' misfortunes and disapproval for acts which interfere with effective performance such as spectator interference by shaking one's head or glaring in disapproval.[43] Other displays of dissatisfaction at acts affecting the fairness of a contest might include demonstrating disapproval with teammates who intentionally attempt to gain an unfair advantage by cheating or appropriately displaying dissatisfaction with bad officiating against either side.

All of these types of acts would seem to represent appropriate ways of displaying caring emotions during the sport contest without disrupting play. According to Shogan the important distinction between the emotional experiences in a direct moral response and a dutiful moral response is that a direct moral response will include an experience of emotion "both during a moral situation and in response to the way in which the situation is resolved...because the person is motivated by what happens to those in the moral situation."[44]

Although sport is not strictly a moral situation involving a resolution of a conflict between two or more individuals, sport is a practice which is guided by procedural rules directed at a fair outcome. Thus, the appropriate display of emotion by contestants during a contest which is directed at a fair outcome can be thought to correspond to the appropriate display of emotion during the resolution of a situation in which fair treatment is morally desirable. The types of acts described above might then be indicative of a direct desire for the fair treatment of those involved in a sport contest. This contention is in keeping with Fraleigh's suggestion that the recipients of such acts "recognize them as the acts of a considerate person" although this is because they indicate a direct concern that the good of all participants be treated equally rather than because "they are not required by duty or obligation" as Fraleigh suggests.

Shogan applies her theory of motivation not only to moral responses in which others are treated fairly, but also to moral responses in which another's welfare is at stake. According to Shogan, a caring person confronted with this type of situation will desire the welfare of others by possessing "a desire to help or (if not in a position to help), a desire that someone helps"[45] or in particular situations "a desire that welfare is enhanced, or in other situations that welfare is not diminished."[46] A caring person's motivating reasons to affect another's welfare positively would then consist of beliefs about the type of situation others are in, about how their welfare can be enhanced or they can be helped, a belief that one ought to respond to another's welfare in a particular way and a desire for the other's welfare.

A contestant's desire for the welfare of others may, as in the case of a desire for fair treatment, be either a direct desire for the welfare of individuals in a particular sport contest or a desire to fulfill an obligation of helping or not diminishing another's welfare. A direct desire for the welfare of the particular individuals involved in a sport contest is dependent upon a recognition of all sport participants as persons capable of experiencing harm and frustration. The orientation discussed in connection to fair treatment in sport may also play a role in developing this type of response as the interdependency underlying this orientation includes a recognition of each other as a facilitator of the other's interests.

In regard to treating others fairly in sport, it was suggested that the entire process of playing the game from start to finish fairly is what determines a fair outcome and thus that any appropriate displays of moral emotions throughout the game may be indicative of a direct desire for the fair treatment of those involved. In the case of a direct concern for another's welfare, appropriate displays of moral emotions would occur both during the moral response itself and at the end of the game. Appropriate displays of emotion attached to a direct desire for the other's welfare might include behaviors such as showing disappointment with teammates who use excessive force against opponents, showing sympathy for opponents who are injured, or sympathetically helping those one accidentally knocks down or trips because of poor skill performance. As Shogan notes, a person possessing a direct concern for others may not always be capable of responding appropriately because of a lack of skill or knowledge of how to help. In such cases participants in sport would demonstrate a concern through an appropriate display of emotion.

The foregoing discussion suggests that a direct moral response may occur in sport and that this type of moral response would, as Arnold suggests, represent the finest tradition of sportsmanship. Shogan's theory of moral motivation offers a further insight which is of particular importance to educators wishing to fulfill the educational objective of developing sportsmanship. This insight is attached to her contention that a caring person is not only caring when confronted by a moral situation.

Rather, a caring person is someone who "fairly permanently desires others' welfare and fair treatment.[47] This, she argues, is to say that a caring person has the character traits of benevolence and justice as character traits are fairly permanet desires.[48] It is because a caring person possesses fairly permanent desires for the welfare and fair treatment of others that he/she will respond appropriately in moral situations fairly consistently.[49] This insight into moral motivation is significant to educators as it suggests that fundamental to bringing about a consistent display of sportsmanship or a consistent occurrence of moral relations in sport is the development of character traits of justice and benevolence as well as a knowledge of when a particular type of moral response is appropriate.

Education of Sportsmanship

The primary concern of this work has been to uncover the nature of sportsmanship as the development of sportmanship has been continually stated as an objective of physical education and sport programs. This investigation into the nature of sportsmanship was launched on the premise that the development of sportsmanship is a worthy educational objective as sportmanship is conduct within sport contests which is essential to the establishment of moral relations in sport. The educational objective of developing sportsmanship entails the development of sport contestants who will play sport in a morally praiseworthy way by adhering to the obligations of fair play and beneficence for moral reaons.

It is beyond the scope of this work to explore fully all the issues which need to be given consideration in designing an effective program for devleoping sportsmanship. However, the foregoing discussion has offerred some important insights into what might be some essential elements in such a program. These insights will briefly be explored.

In the early chapters of this work it was noted that educators have often presumed that mere participation in sport would bring about the development of moral character. The discussion presented in this work suggests that mere engagement in sport is no guarantee of this. The evidence drawn on by the anticompetition lobby of the high incidence of immoral and selfish acts inundating the sports world shows clearly that participation in sport does not guarantee a development of moral character traits.

It was also noted that physical educators concerned with the development of sportsmanship frequently claim that a mere awareness of a set of guidelines of how one ought to act will in itself increase the incidence of sportsmanlike behavior in sport. The foregoing discussion of moral motivation suggests, however, that this alone will not guarantee an increase of moral conduct in sport.

In discussing moral motivation it was suggested that an agent will act in a certain way when he or she has motivating reasons to do so. Motivating reasons consist of both desires and beliefs. In general terms an individual will be motivated to act morally if he or she possesses beliefs about a situation being a moral situation, beliefs about the types of acts morally appropriate in a particular situation and a desire to act morally. More specifically, one must possess a desire for the fair treatment of others involved in a conflict or taking part in a practice directed at fairness or a desire for another's welfare in situations in which others can be harmed or flourish.

It was suggested in the foregoing section that a morally caring person is one who will consistently act morally because he or she possesses a fairly permanent desire to treat others fairly and a fairly permanent desire to enhance (or not diminish) another's welfare. If character traits are understood to be fairly permanent desires then a caring person is one who possesses the character traits of justice and benevolence. An educational program directed at a consistent occurrence of moral conduct in sport must then attempt to develop these character traits as well as a knowledge of moral conduct in sport.

Shogan suggests that the development of fairly permanent moral desires cannot happen overnight. Arguing from Murdoch's contention that moral change is a life-long process because the type of person one is, is dependent upon a lifelong process of what is looked at and seen by a person, Shogan suggests that "any decision someone makes in a moral situation is continuous with the rest of a person's life."[50] More specifically, her claim is that what an agent "has given attention to most often prior to a moral situation"[51] will determine his or her response in a particular situation. This contention is based upon the Murdochian notion that what we regularly give attention to determines what we desire or are compelled by. From this standpoint it is apparent, as Shogan suggests, that if caring desires are to be developed or expanded, an agent's attention must be directed to objects of "positive looking" and away from objects of "negative looking."[52] Under Murdoch's theory of attention objects of positive looking include "anything which alters consciousness in the direction of unselfishness, objectivity, and realism",[53] while negative looking is associated with personal fantasy, self-aggrandizement and a fat relentless ego.[54]

The development of sportsmanship is thus dependent upon the attention of sport participants being directed in a way that will help to alter their consciousness in the direction of unselfishness and away from self-aggrandizement. Meakin captures the importance of this in his comment that engagement in competitive sport might be morally miseducative if:

> the teacher were to encourage pupils to develop towards their opponents attitudes such that they regarded them virtually as enemies, to whom hatred or antagonism were appropriate, or as impersonal objects standing between themselves and success...rather than as co-competitors to whom a certain amount of consideration was due and as partners in a common enterprise with aspirations like their own.[55]

Earlier in this chapter it was suggested that educating sport participants in an orientation towards competition in sport which emphasizes an interdependence and mutual respect among competitors may play a role in developing sport participants who directly desire the fair treatment and welfare of their fellow contestants. The directing of sport particpants' attention towards the possibility of sport being an activity of mutual conferment rather than selfish aggrandizement may offer an opportunity for educators to develop caring desires towards their opponents. Although whether or not this desire will, in a particular situation, be a direct desire towards the particular individuals may be dependent upon a participant's assessment of the personal qualities of their opponent, this type of attending may help to expand an agent's caring desire towards more opponents.

Shogan notes that benevolent and just desires are developed by "seeing" the objects and experiences their attention is drawn to in a certain way and not just "looking at" them.[56] Meakin captures this idea in further explaining that in directing an athlete's attention towards possible ways of competing, the coach/teacher should discuss with the athlete the moral values involved in the activity they are participating in.[57] The aim of this instruction is to help them to see the activity of sport in a particular way through assisting them to "reflect on these values, understanding them, to see the consequences of not adhering to them, and ultimately to decide to embrace them."[58] He suggests that this type of educational process can readily be conducted informally while teaching the rules of play and coaching in skills, tactics and strategy.[59] These teaching situations clearly offer opportunities for coaches and educators to direct their students' attention towards the morality of playing by the rules and the moral values upon which tactics and strategy can be assessed as morally good or bad because of the effect they may have upon the fair treatment or welfare of others.

The understanding gained through such discussions is, of course, dependent upon the student's/athlete's understanding and beliefs they have about what constitutes fair treatment and what constitutes suffering and flourishing.[60] Meakin captures this requirement of a successful educational program for morality in sport in suggesting that sport offers opportunity for developing knowledge of facts relevant to moral decision-making.[61] He suggests that this understanding can be gained through making participants aware of the actual or possible consequences of one's conduct on others through reflective discussion. More specifically, he suggests that these discussions may include consideration of "the kinds of conduct that cause physical injury, and any that provoke or anger people and cause psychological distress."[62] In these reflective discussions the educator/coach can attempt to raise the student's understanding of moral concepts such as harm, help and fairness which will play a role in their beliefs about particular situations. This type of discussion may also play a role in assisting sport participants to identify the types of situations in sport in which they can act from moral reasons.

This process of attention towards the effect of embracing certain values in playing sport can be enhanced by calling attention to those "occasions when competitors do respect the moral presuppositions of their sport"[63] and recommending such players as models to emulate while giving reasons for such commendation. Meakin also suggests that educators can further their educational goal of developing moral relations in sport by directing their students' attention to the immoral practices often found in professional sport and using this as a vehicle for discussing moral values in sport. This may, however, not have the desired result as the directing of young athletes' attention to these occurrences is to direct their attention towards selfish, self-aggrandizing acts rather than towards the positive values one is attempting to develop. Value may, however, be gained by coaches condemning the immoral conduct of the athletes they are in charge of and discussing with the athletes why these acts are contrary to moral relations in sport.

In discussing a moral agent's ability to recognize a situation as one in which another's welfare or fair treatment is involved, Shogan notes that an ability to imagine what it is like for others in particular situations is significant.[64] Meakin suggests that while educating individuals in sport there are numerous occaisons in which this ability to empathize can be developed. In particular he notes that participants must develop an ability to know what a teammate is going to do which demands seeing the game from his piont of view and, secondly, that as all will win or lose at some time, they can be aware of how it feels to lose and learn not to display overbearing pride or contempt.[65] Numerous other occasions exist for the development of empathy towards one's opponents. Occasions when a team's opportunity to meet the challenge of testing their abilities are affected by unfair play, cheating, poor officiating and so on can be used to direct the athletes' attention to how this affects them and would correspondingly affect others with similar interests. Similarly occasions in which opponents play with excessive force or in which a teammate is injured can be used to direct the participants' attention towards how others would be affected if they were to play in a similar way. These occasions for reflective discussion also offer an opportunity for sport participants to be shown an appropriate way to display moral emotions.

Another significant way in which sport participants might be educated in appropriate displays of moral emotions is by coaches displaying their own satisfaction with moral conduct and dissatisfaction with immoral acts in an appropriate way. Shogan notes that an individual who is important to another can significantly affect what is noticed and that "attempting to see what someone who is admired sees about an enterprise is an important step in the process of attention".[66] Similarly Meakin notes that it is often contended that students often model the behavior of teachers and coaches. Thus, he notes that, if the modelling theory has any truth to it "the attitude and conduct of coaches and teachers towards their pupils must be reckoned crucial factors in moral learning."[67] Accordingly, he notes that educators must take care to ensure that their teaching methods reflect the values of respect for opponents, fair play, and consideration of others which they are attempting to develop.[68] Their actions towards officials and opposing teams should similarly reflect these same values.

Educators and coaches wishing to develop moral relations in sport should then be morally caring individuals themselves. Caring persons not only desire the welfare and fair treatment of others, but also desire the development of these character traits in others to increase the likelihood of moral relations between people. Caring physical educators and coaches ought then to desire the fulfillment of the eduational objective of developing sportsmanship, seek out a fuller understanding of this objective, and encourage research into the development of programs directed towards this end. It is hoped by the writer that the foregong has served to further this end in at least a small way.

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